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1940 Supreme(Mad) 42

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
King, J.
M.R. Ranganatha Aiyar
Versus
Jayavelu Mudaliar and Anr.
Decided On : 15.02.1940

The evidence given on special oath is conclusive proof only in the proceeding in which it is received, and its applicability to subsequent proceedings is limited.

Headnote:

Oaths Act - Interpretation of Section 11 - Sections 8 and 9 - Evidence given on special oath - Conclusive proof - Proceedings in which the evidence was given - Challenge to oath - Suit under Order 21, Rule 103 - Continuation of proceeding - Doctrine of lis pendens - Effect of evidence in claim petition on subsequent suit

Fact of the Case:

The appellant claimed title to the western half of a house, and the respondent took delivery of the entire house in execution of a decree against the appellant's cousin. The appellant applied for redelivery of the western half under Order 21, Rule 100, and gave evidence on special oath. The respondent filed a suit under Rule 103, challenging the evidence given on oath.

Finding of the Court:

The court analyzed the interpretation of Section 11 of the Indian Oaths Act and determined that the evidence given on special oath is conclusive proof against the person who offered to be bound, but the scope of its applicability to subsequent proceedings was debated. The court found that the suit under Rule 103 is not a continuation of the proceeding under Rule 100, and the evidence given in the claim petition does not automatically apply to the subsequent suit.

Issues: Interpretation of Section 11 of the Indian Oaths Act, applicability of evidence given on special oath to subsequent proceedings, and the effect of evidence in claim petition on a subsequent suit.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the evidence given on special oath is conclusive proof only in the proceeding in which it is received, and the suit under Rule 103 is not a continuation of the claim petition proceeding. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the subsequent proceeding, and the evidence in the claim petition does not automatically affect the subsequent suit.

Final Decision: The court upheld the order of remand by the District Judge, dismissing the appeal with costs.

JUDGMENT

King, J.

1. The appellant in this appeal claims title to the western half of a certain house. The respondent was a decree-holder against a cousin of the appellant, who, according to the appellant, owned the eastern half. In execution of the decree, the respondent took delivery of the entire house. There was then an application under Order 21, Rule 100 by the appellant asking the Court to redeliver to him the western half of this house. During the progress of the inquiry into-that application, the respondent challenged the appellant in the following words:

If the petitioner swears on oath that the western half of the suit house belongs to him solely and that he himself built it and at the time when the plaintiff went for taking delivery it was in his possession, then to the extent of the western half, the petition may be allowed.

2. The appellant accepted the challenge and gave evidence on special oath in the affirmative on all the three points put to him by the respondent. This oath was of course followed by the allowing of the appellants petition. The respondent then filed a suit under Rule 103 against the appellant and his brother and they took the objection that no suit would lie because of the evidence which the appellant had given on oath. This preliminary objection was upheld by the District Munsif. On appeal, the learned District Judge of Vellore found that the oath was no bar to the suit and accordingly remanded the suit for disposal after trial on the other issues. Against that order of remand, the present appeal has been filed.

3. The main question to be decided in this appeal is the interpretation of Section 11 of the Indian Oaths Act. Section 11 which refers to evidence given on special oath runs as follows:

The evidence so given shall, as against the person who offered to be bound as aforesaid, be conclusive proof of the matter stated.

4. And the question which I have now to decide is whether this section relates to the proceeding in which the evidence was given alone or whether it relates to all possible proceedings in which the subject-matter of the evidence given on oath may be involved. In favour of the latter view is no doubt the fact that in Section 11 no specific statement is made restricting the particular proceedings in which the evidence shall be conclusive proof. On the other hand, Sections 8 and 9 obviously refer to some one judicial proceeding, and it seems to me the only proper method of interpreting Section 11 is to interpret it in conjunction with Sections 8 and 9 and that its primary meaning must be that the evidence given in any proceeding in which a challenge has been made and an oath, has been taken shall be in that proceeding conclusive proof of the matter stated. This seems to me clear from the expression "the evidence so given". It cannot automatically be evidence at all except in the proceeding in which it is actually being received. If there is a subsequent proceeding, then until that statement made on oath is brought into that subsequent proceeding, it cannot even be considered.

5. It is however argued on behalf of the appellant that although the suit under Order 21, Rule 103, may not in one sense be the same proceeding as a petition under Rule 100, it is, nevertheless, a continuation of, or in the nature of an appeal from that form of proceeding and therefore any evidence given under the special provisions of the Oaths Act in a proceeding under Rule 100 must be conclusive proof in any suit under Rule 103. In support of this argument, I have been referred to a decision in Krishnappa Chetty v. Abdul Khader Saheb (1913) 26 M.L.J. 449 : I.L.R. 38 Mad. 535, in which it has been held that a suit of this kind is a continuation, of a claim petition with regard to the doctrine of lis pendens. In Krishnappa Chetty v. Abdul Khader Sahib (1913) 26 M.L.J. 449 : I.L.R. 38 Mad. 535, an alienation which took place between the disposal of a claim petition and the institution of a suit was held to be aff




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