SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1940 Supreme(Mad) 208

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
King, J.
Bapalal and Co.
Versus
A.R. Kishnaswami Aiyar
Decided On : 02.08.1940

A complaint to a Police Officer is absolutely privileged, precluding the Civil Court from adjudicating upon whether it was sent maliciously or not.

Headnote:

Defamation - Privilege - Summary

Fact of the Case:

Respondent, a Medical Practitioner, took diamonds from the appellants on approval but did not pay for them. Appellants sent a letter to the Police, claimed to be defamatory by the respondent, alleging criminal breach of trust. The lower court held the letter was not privileged and decreed the suit in favor of the respondent.

Finding of the Court:

The appellate court held that the letter in question was absolutely privileged, precluding the Civil Court from adjudicating upon whether it was sent maliciously or not.

Issues: The main issue was whether the letter sent by the appellants to the Police was privileged and whether the lower court erred in its decision.

Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on various authorities to establish that a complaint to a Police Officer is absolutely privileged, and the weight of authority favored this view.

Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the respondent's suit was dismissed.

JUDGMENT

King, J.

1. This appeal arises out of a suit riled by respondent against the appellants for damages for defamation. The facts may be stated very briefly. Respondent, a Medical Practitioner in Madras took some diamonds from the appellants a firm of jewellers, on approval in April, 1936. On 25th May appellants presented him with an invoice for their cost. By 27th September, the diamonds had not been paid for. On that day the appellants sent a letter to the Inspector of Police, Flower Bazaar Police Station, which is claimed by respondent to be defamatory, as being equivalent to a charge against him of criminal breach of trust. In their written statement appellants contended that this communication was privileged, having been sent bona fide with the sole purpose of protecting their own interests. The learned City Civil Judge held that the occasion was privileged and if the letter were in fact bona fide the suit must be dismissed, but he held further that the letter did not state the true facts; that there was an outright sale on 25th May; and that the appellants were maliciously referring to the Police for investigation what they knew could be only the subject-matter of a civil claim. He accordingly decreed the suit.

2. In appeal an entirely new point has been taken with reference to the law of privilege. It is now contended that the letter in question was privileged absolutely, that is to say, that a Civil Court is precluded from adjudicating upon the question whether it was sent maliciously or not. On a careful consideration of the authorities I think this contention must prevail.

3. The principal authorities to which I have been referred to in the course of the arguments are Sanjivi Reddi v. Koneri Reddi (1925) 50 M.L.J. 460 : I.L.R. 49 Mad. 315, Golap Jan v. Bholanath Khettry I.L.R.(1911)Cal. 880, Madhab Chandra Ghose v. Nirod Chandra Ghose I.L.R. (1939) 1 Cal. 574 and Majju v. Lachman Prasad I.L.R. (1924) All. 671 . All these authorities are unanimous in holding that the common law of England which grants an absolute privilege to all statements made in the witness-box should be applied in India. That privilege extends in England to the preliminary examination of witnesses, e.g., by a solicitor to find out what they can prove see Watson v. MEwan (1905) A.C. 480. The question then is how far this principle derived from Watson v. MEwan (1905) A.C. 480 should be extended. Sanjivi Reddi v. Koneri Reddi (1925) 50 M.L.J. 460 : I.L.R. 49 Mad. 315 dealt with a complaint to a Magistrate requesting him to take action under Section 107, Criminal Procedure Code, and to statements made by the complainant to a Police Officer investigating that complaint. Both were held to be absolutely privileged. No actual evidence was given in this case, as the Magistrate eventually refused to take any action under Section 107. In Golap Jan v. Bholanath Khettry I.L.R.(1911)Cal. 880, a complaint laid before a Magistrate for criminal breach 6i trust which led to no trial but was dismissed under Section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, was held to be absolutely privileged. In Madhab Chandra Ghose v. Nirod Chandra Ghose I.L.R. (1939) 1 Cal. 574, it was held that both a report to the police alleging the commission of a crime, and evidence given in Court in support of the accusation were absolutely privileged. In Majju v. Lachman Prasad I.L.R.(1924)All. 671 , a distinction was drawn between a complaint to the police which in fact led to judicial proceedings, and one which did not. A complaint in the latter case was held not to be privileged.

4. Now there is nothing in the three other decisions referred to above to suggest that this particular ground of distinction would find favour with the Madras or Calcutta High Courts. In Sanjivi Reddi v. Koneri Reddi (1925) 50 M.L.J. 460 : I.L.R. 49 Mad. 315 and Golap Jan v. Bholanath Khettry I.L.R.(1911) Cal. 880, complaints to a Magistrate were held absolutely privileged, even though the Magistrate dismissed them. In Mad

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top