The main legal point established in the judgment is that the succession to the trusteeship of the temple is not hereditary, as the scheme prescribes an elective mode of succession and not a hereditary one.

Wadsworth, J.

1. This appeal and the Civil Revision Petition which is filed in the alternative challenge the correctness of the decision of the District Judge of Chingleput on an application to set aside an order of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board declaring the temple of Sri Devarajaswami at Conjeeveram to be an excepted temple on the ground that the right of succession to the office of trustee has been hereditary. The learned District Judge agreed with the view of the Board that the temple was an excepted temple within the definition in Section 9(5) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act.

2. A preliminary objection raises the question whether the appeal is maintainable and if not whether there are any grounds which justify interference in revision. In our opinion, there is no right of appeal against the order of the Court under Section 84(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. So much was decided by the Full Bench which heard the case of Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras (1933) 66 M.L.J. 43 : I.L.R. 57 Mad. 271 . It has however been contended that this decision is no longer authoritative in the light of the decision of a later Full Bench in the case of Chikkanna v. Perumal AIR1940Mad474 , but we are unable to accept this contention. It is true that the later decision expresses the view that in the light of subsequent Privy Council decisions, Rajagopala Chettiars case (1933) 66 M.L.J. 43 : I.L.R. 57 Mad. 271 , has given an explanation of the decision of the Privy Council in Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao (1922) 43 M.L.J. 78 : 49 I.A. 129 : I.L.R. 45 Mad. 320 , which can no longer be regarded as authoritative; but the Full Bench which took this view was not concerned with the correctness of the decision of the earlier Full Bench regarding the appealability of an order under Section 84(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. All that the learned Judges were concerned ,with was the earlier Full Benchs interpretation of a Privy Council decision which was quoted in support of an argument that a decision under Section 84(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act was a decree. Ramachandra Raos case, like Chikkannas case was concerned with the finality of a decision on a reference to the Court by the Collector under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. The learned Judges who decided the case of Rajagopala Chettiar (1922) 43 M.L.J. 78 : 49 I.A. 129 : I.L.R. 45 Mad. 320 , advanced various reasons for holding that a decision under Section 84(2) of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act is not a decree. Though a portion of the reasoning in the judgment may be said to have been shaken by the later Full Bench decision, it cannot, in our opinion, be said that the decision, in Rajagopala Chettiars case (1933). 66 M.L.J. 43 : I.L.R. 57 Mad. 271 is no longer good law in so far as it decides the main question before the Full Bench. That decision binds us and we must hold that no appeal lies against the order of the District Judge. The matter is not one of very great importance in the present case, for an alternative revision petition has been filed and we are of opinion that there are materials for holding that the District Judge has acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction, so as to justify interference in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

3. The Sri Devarajaswami temple is governed by a scheme laid down by this Court in the case of Thathachariar v. Thathachariar (1912)23MLJ134 . This decision sets forth at length the previous history of the disputes regarding the management of the temple. We do not propose to repeat this historical matter. It is only necessary to say that in this scheme suit the plaintiffs claimed that the hereditary right of Dharmakartaship appertained to the lineal descendants of one Koti Kanyakadanam Thatha Desikar. The contesting parties were the existing trustees and certain other claimants who fell into different