A surrender by a Hindu widow to her immediate reversioners does not amount to a conveyance, and the rule of estoppel and the doctrine of election may not be applicable to such surrenders.

Krishnaswami Aiyangar, J.

1. One Venkatanarasimhayya died in 1887, leaving him surviving his widow Lakshmamma who succeeded to his properties for a limited estate under Hindu Law. In 1923, Lakshmamma executed a deed of surrender by which she relinquished in favour of the then nearest reversioners, the entire estate inherited by her from her husband. The reversioners were Veeraraghavayya and Narayanayya. The deed recites that she had previously received from the reversioners a sum of Rs. 200, for necessary purposes. She also received for her maintenance a further sum of Rs. 300 from one of them--Veeraraghavayya at the time of the registration of the deed. Of the several properties included in the surrender, the suit property was one, though at the time the title to it was under dispute in a suit then pending between Veeraraghavayya on the one side and the widow and Narayanayya on the other. In that suit Veeraraghavayya denied that it formed part of Venkatanarasimhayyas estate and asserted that it was really his own. Subsequent to the surrender, the two reversioners effected a partition of the properties surrendered, but the suit property was not included in the division. It was for a partition of this property said to have been left undivided that the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen, was instituted by the first respondent Narayanayya in the Court of the District Munsif of Ongole. He alleged that there was an oral arrangement between him and Veeraraghavayya for the specific allotment of particular shares in the property to each of the two sharers, though effect had not been given to it by actual mutation of possession. The contesting defendant was the appellant who is the representative in interest of Veeraraghavayya.

2. The District Munsif held that the oral arrangement set up by the respondent was not true, but none the less decreed partition, on the ground that the property was the common property of the two reversioners still remaining to be divided between them. The first defendant who stood in the position of an assignee from Veeraraghavayya appealed to the Subordinate Judge of Bapatla. The learned Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. A Second Appeal was then filed in this Court by Narayanayya. Patanjali Sastri, J., who heard it, was of opinion that the (decision of the Subordinate Judge was incorrect, and he accordingly allowed the appeal and restored the decree of the District Munsif. The first defendant, who was the first respondent in the second appeal has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal in pursuance of the leave granted to him by the learned Judge.

3. The Subordinate Judge has found that the disputed property did not form part of Venkatanarasimhayyas estate, but belonged absolutely to Veeraraghavayya in his own independent title and was and continued to be in his possession from a date anterior to the surrender. The Subordinate Judge was also of opinion that the possession of Veeraraghavayya being a possession held by him in his own right, was adverse to Lakshmamma. From these findings which are binding on us, it is clear that the suit property should not have been included in the surrender. The. reason for the inclusion is, however, obvious. The parties had apparently in mind the rule of Hindu Law that for a surrender to be operative, it must be complete, that is, it must be of the whole estate. They were afraid of leaving out the suit property which was under litigation at the time. For if it should ultimately turn out that it did in fact form part of the estate, the surrender would be open to the attack that it was partial and, therefore, invalid. The judgment of Patanjali Sastri, J., is entirely based on the view that the rule of estoppel enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Dalton v. Fitzgerald (1897)L.R. 2 Ch. 86, is applicable to the facts of this case, with the result that he held that the appellant is precluded from putting forward Veeraraghavayyas independent title to th