The temporary nature of the order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure distinguished the case from precedent, and the suit was not barred by limitation.

Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.

1. This appeal arises out of another dispute between the Thengalais and Vadagalais. In the village of Thirukkannaraangai in the Tanjore District is a Thengalai temple known as the Sri Bakthavathsala Perurmal Temple. The dispute is with reference to the twenty days festival, which commences in the month of December and ends in January and is known as Pagal Pathu and Ra Pathu. It is common ground that up to 1909 the right to conduct the festival, including the right to recite the Vedam, Mantrapushpam and Prabandam, was possessed by the Thengalais. In 1900 a number of Vadagalais filed a suit (O.S. No. 506 of 1900) in the Court of the District Munsif of Tiruvarur for a declaration that a certain shrine in the temple had been dedicated to the spiritual leader of the Vadagalais and they obtained a decree, which was confirmed by this Court on the 25th November, 1909. The Vadagalais maintain that the decree finally decided that the right to conduct the festival is in them, but this the Thengalais strenuously deny. The effect of the decree is in dispute in the present suit, but for the purposes of deciding this Letters Patent appeal it is not necessary to consider this matter as the appeal only relates to a question of limitation. If the appellant succeeds in establishing his contention, that the suit is not time-barred the case will have to be remanded to King, J., from whose judgment the appeal has been preferred, for decision on the question whether the decree in O.S. No. 506 of 1900 operates as res judicata. On the passing of this Courts decree on the 17th November, 1909 the Vadagalais asserted that they had been given right to conduct the festival and on 19th January, 1911, they obtained from a Magistrate an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure preventing the Thengalais from interfering with them in the conduct of the festival which was then being held, arid they obtained a similar order on the 19th December, 1914. There were other orders of a similar nature between these two dates, but it is not necessary to specify them.

2. After 1914 the festival was not held again until the year 1927. The trustee refused to allow it to be held. It has been suggested that the reason was that there were no funds available for the purpose, but I do not think that it is going too far to assign the real reason to a desire on the part of the trustee to avoid clashes between these antagonistic sects. The record does not show whether the festival which commenced in December, 1927, was conducted exclusively by the Vadagalais, but there is some indication that the Thengalais did participate for part of the time. There was no festival in the following year, but in 1929-30 the festival was again held and the Vadagalais appear to have had complete control. On the 3rd January, 1930, that is, while the 1929-30 festival was being held, the appellant, who is a Thengalai, filed the present suit in the Court of the District Munsif of Nannilam for a declaration that an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which the Vadagalais had obtained that day from the Sub-Magistrate of Kodavasal, was illegal and that the Vadagalais were not entitled to exercise any rights in connection with the temple to the exclusion of the Thengalais. The defendants pleaded limitation and res judicata, relying for the second plea on the decree passed in OS. No. 506. The District Munsif held that the suit was not barred and granted the declaration asked for by the appellant. On appeal the District judge of East Tanjore held that the suit was not barred so far as it related to the first ten days of the festival, but that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata so far as it concerned the second ten days. Both sides appealed and their appeals were heard by King, J., who held that Article 120 of the Limitation Act applied and that the suit was barred in its entirety by-reason of the fact that it had not been