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1940 Supreme(Mad) 282

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Venkataramana Rao, J.
Marina Ammayi
Versus
Secretary of State and Ors.
Decided On : 30.08.1940

The main legal point established in the judgment is the mandatory nature of Section 80, Civil P.C., as a condition precedent to the institution of a suit against the Crown or a public officer, and the interpretation that there must be a full two months after the delivery of the notice.

Headnote:

Section 80 - Proper Notice - Section 80, Civil P.C. - Summary of Acts and Sections: Section 80, Civil P.C. - The judgment discusses the interpretation and application of Section 80, Civil P.C., which provides a condition precedent to the institution of a suit against the Crown or a public officer. The court emphasizes the mandatory nature of the section and the requirement for full two months after the delivery of the notice. It also refers to legal principles from previous cases to support its interpretation.

Fact of the Case:

The suit arises from a dispute regarding the service of notice under Section 80, Civil P.C. The lower courts dismissed the suit based on the failure to comply with the notice requirements. The plaintiff claimed exemption of time due to the notice, while the Collector contended that the suit was bad for want of proper notice.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the suit was filed within two months of the date of receipt of the notice, thus not complying with the provisions of Section 80, Civil P.C. It held that the suit was premature and dismissed it.

Issues: The main issue was whether the suit was maintainable for want of proper notice under Section 80, Civil P.C. The court also considered the argument of waiver of the plea by the Secretary of State.

Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the interpretation that there must be a full two months after the delivery of the notice, excluding the day of delivery. It also emphasized the mandatory nature of Section 80, Civil P.C., and the inability to waive the plea due to its statutory and imperative provisions.

Final Decision: The second appeal failed, and the court dismissed the appeal, directing each party to bear their own costs throughout. Leave to appeal was refused.

JUDGMENT

Venkataramana Rao, J.

1. The question for decision IH whether the suit out of which this second appeal arises is liable to be dismissed for want of proper notice under Section 80, Civil P.C. Both the lower Courts dismissed the suit. The question now is whether the dismissal is proper. The notice of suit given to the Collector was dated 20th October 1932. Both the Courts have concurrently found that the notice was served on 21st October 1982. The suit was instituted on 21st December 1932. In the plaint, the allegation is that defendant 1, the Secretary of State for India represented by the Collector of East Godawary acknowledged the notice on 21st October but however failed to comply with the demand therein. The plaintiff claimed exemption of the two months time occupied; by reason of the said notice. The reply of the Collector on behalf of the Secretary of State was that the amount of claim was not mentioned in the said notice and the suit was bad for want of proper notice. The following issue was raised: "Whether the suit is not maintainable for want of proper notice under Section 80, Civil P.C. When the case was taken up for trial, the Secretary of State under a mistaken impression contended that the notice was served on him on 22nd October 1932 and the learned subordinate Judge accepted this contention but his decision was reversed on appeal on the ground that notice was actually delivered at the Collectors office on 2ist October 1932 and in remanding the appeal the learned District Judge remarked thus:

It was contended by the Government Pleader that even if the notice had really been received on 21st October 1932 the suit filed on 21st December 1932 would still be within two months of the date of the receipt of the original notice. This point too does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned subordinate Judge. I consider that the disposal of the suit in the lower Court is unsatisfactory in the sense that none of these points have been adjudicated upon.

2. The learned subordinate Judge who dealt with the case after remand came to the conclusion that the suit having been filed within two months of the date of receipt of the notice provisions of Section 80, Civil P.C. were not complied with. He therefore dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned District Judge concurred in this view. Mr. Lakshmanna on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant contends that this view is wrong. He submits that both the lower Courts have wrongly construed Section 80, Civil P.C., and in computing the period of two months the day on which notice was served ought to have been included and not excluded and that if it was so included, the suit was in compliance with Section 80, Civil P.C. He further contends that in any event it must be held that the Government has waived this specific plea. Section 80, Civil P.C., so far as it is relevant for the present discussion runs thus:

No suit shall be instituted against the Crown, or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of a suit against a Provincial Government, delivered to, or left at the office of, a Secretary to that Government or the Collector of the District....

3. This section therefore provides a condition precedent to the institution of a suit. As observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State, Section 80, Civil P.C., is explicit and mandatory. If the suit is tiled before the expiration of two months after notice had been delivered or left at the office of the Collector, it is not maintainable and the Court is bound to dismiss it. The question therefore is whether two months expired after the notice in question was served on the Collector. The language of the section indicates that there must be full two months after delivery of the notice. This in my opinion follows from the
















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