The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of 'personal law' under Section 88 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act and its application to the validity of marriages, particularly in the context of marriages between individuals of different denominations.

Happell, J.

1. This is a petition to revise the judgment of the Special First Glass Magistrate, Devakottai, in Calendar Case No. 76 of 1944, by which he has acquitted the first and third accused in that case. The 1st accused was baptised a Roman Catholic and married his first wife in a Roman Catholic Church. The complainant P.W. 1 is a protestant and in 1930, after the death of his first wife, the 1st accused married her in a Protestant Church, the ceremony being performed by a Protestant Pastor. Two children were born of the marriage. On 19th May, 1942, the complainant executed a release deed Ex. 1, in favour of the 1st accused--the relevance of this deed will appear later. On 16th September, 1943, the 1st accused married the 2nd accused in a Roman Catholic Church, the ceremony being performed by the 3rd accused, a Roman Catholic Priest. Thereafter on 14th December, 1943, P.W. 1 filed a complaint in the Court of the Joint Magistrate of Ramnad charging the 1st and 2nd accused with the offence of bigamy punishable under Section 494 of the Penal Code, and the 3rd accused with abetment of the offence.

2. Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code reads:

Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished, etc.

3. The marriage between the 1st accused and the complainant in 1930 was a marriage solemnized under the provisions of the Indian Christian Marriage Act (Act XV of 1872). Section 1 of that Act states that the Act " extends to the whole of British India " and Section 4 provides that:

Every marriage between persons one or both of whom is (or are) a Christian or Christiansj shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of the next following section; and any such marriage solemnized otherwise than in accordance with such provisions shall be void.

4. It is not disputed that the marriage between the accused and the complainant was solemnized in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of the Act. A marriage solemnized under the provisions of the Indian Christian Marriage Act subsists so that any second marriage by either of the parties to the first marriage during the lifetime of the other party is void unless the marriage has been dissolved under the provisions of Section 10 of the Divorce Act or declared null and void under Section 18 on any of the grounds set out in Section 19. It may be conceded, howeyer, that a person accused of an offence under Section 494, I.P. Code, may plead in his defence that the first marriage was null and void even though he has not obtained a declaration to that effect under Section 18 of the Divorce Act. In the present case the 1st and 3rd accused raised two defences: First that the marriage of the 1st accused to the 2nd was not in any case void because the release deed--Ex. I--executed by the complainant operated as a dissolution of the marriage between the 1st accused and herself according to the custom of the community to which they both belonged; and, secondly, that the marriage in 1930 was not a valid marriage by reason of the provisions of Section 88 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act. The and accused was discharged on the ground that there was no proof that she knew of the 1st accuseds previous marriage and her case is not before me.

5. The learned Magistrate has not specifically found that the release deed operated as a dissolution of marriage so that the marriage between the 1st and 2nd accused was not void; but he has treated it as a point in favour of the first accused. It might perhaps have been taken into consideration on a question of sentence, but it should not have been allowed to affect the question whether the 1st accused had committed the offence charged or not. The custom is not of course a part of the personal law of the parties which invalidates the marriage ab initio, and there is nothing in the Indian Divorce Act which permits the dissolution