The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically regarding the starting point of limitation for execution proceedings and the decree sought to be executed in cases involving appeals.

Kuppuswami Ayyar, J.

1. This appeal arises out of proceedings in execution and the question for consideration is as to whether the execution petition out of which the appeal arises is barred by limitation. The decree in the suit was passed on the 1st December, 1922. It directed delivery of certain properties on payment of a certain amount. The original decree directed that Rs. 17,644-12-0 should be deposited. There was an appeal and the appellate Court on 28th September, 1926, modified the decree of the first Court and reduced the amount to be deposited to Rs. 6,113-8-0. It was taken to this Court in second appeal which was dismissed on the 21st November, 1930. The first execution petition, E.P. No. 169 of 1933, was filed on the 21st November, 1933. After enquiry as regards the amount that had to be deposited an order was passed on the 23rd March, 1934, directing the decree-holder to deposit into Court Rs. 6,960-0-2 by a particular date fixed by the Court. As the amount was not deposited, the petition was dismissed on the 9th April, 1934. The matter was taken to the Madura District Court in appeal which appeal was dismissed on the 7th March, 1936. A civil miscellaneous second appeal was filed in this Court, No. 127 of 1936, which was dismissed on the 17th August, 1939. This petition, E.P. No. 105 of 1942, out of which this appeal arises, was filed on the 13th August, 1942.

2. Three objections on the ground of limitation were raised, one of which was that the application E.P. No. 169 of 1933, filed on the 21st November, 1933, was not a proper application in accordance with law, as the amount directed to be paid before the decree-holder could obtain delivery of possession was not deposited with the application. The second objection raised was that the present application, E.P. No. 105 of 1942, was filed more than three years after the date of the final order on E.P. No. 169 of 1933. It was contended, however, that the final order would be the order in C.M. S.A. No. 127 of 1936 which was passed by this Court on the 17th August, 1939. The third objection raised was that as this application was filed on the 13th August, 1942, more than twelve years after the date of the lower appellate decree it was barred by limitation under Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. With regard to the first objection it has been held by a Bench of this Court that even though the amount which has to be deposited before delivery could be given was not deposited with the application, it would still be a proper application if it otherwise fulfils the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure--Vide Alagiriswami Naidu v. Venkatachalapathi Iyer (1907) 17 M.L.J. 566 : I.L.R. 31 Mad. 77.

3. With regard to the second point, there is a decision of a Bench of this Court in Abdul Razak v. Abubakkar Ambalam L.P.A. No. 67 of 1939 which has held that the starting point of limitation is the date of the final order of the " final Court of Appeal.

4. The appeal was argued mainly on the objection based under Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section runs thus:

Where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting an injunction has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of twelve years from (a) the date of the decree sought to be executed * * * * *

In the corresponding section in the old Code of 1882 there were the words "or of the decree in appeal if any affirming the same " indicating thereby that if there is anyappeal against any decree and the appeal was dismissed by affirming the decree appealed against, the twelve years started from the date of the appellate decree. Because there was this specific provision in the Code of 1882 about the starting point of limitation in cases where a decree has been affirmed on appeal and that provision is not found in the Code of 1908, it is urged that in such cases the starting point is not the date of the