Somayya, J.

1. The main question involved in this appeal is whether the decision of the District Court under Section 84, Clause (2) upholding the order of the Madras Hindu Religions Endowments Board under Section 84(1), Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 2 [II] of 1927, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) operates as res judicata in a subsequent suit by the defeated trustee. The temple in question was declared by the Endowments Board to be a non-excepted temple on an application filed under Section 84(1) of the Act. It was urged in that application that the applicant and his forefathers were the hereditary trustees of the temple. This was negatived and the petition was dismissed. The applicants then filed the suit out of which the present appeal arises for a declaration that the office of trusteeship was hereditary in their family, and that they and their predecessors were the hereditary trustees of the temple. They also filed an application under Section 84(2) of the Act in the District Court of Guntur (O.P. No. 96 of 1942). In the present suit the Court held, among other things, that the plaintiffs did not prove that they were the hereditary trustees and hence this appeal.

2. After the disposal of the suit by the lower Court, the petition (O.P. No. 96 of 1942) filed in the District Court came on for hearing, the matter was enquired into and the District Court decided that the petitioners before it did not prove that they were the hereditary trustees of the temple. We heard Mrs. Durga Bai who addressed a very forcible argument on the facts and were of the opinion that on the merits the appellants had a good case. Then it was brought to our notice that O.P. No. 96 of 1942 which was filed in the District Court of Guntur and which was pending when the judgment under appeal was rendered, was subsequently tried on the merits and a decision adverse to the appellants was given by that Court. We were also told that the matter was brought up in revision to this Court and that this Court declined to interfere. It was, therefore, urged that apart from the correctness of the decision of the lower Court on the merits, the appellants were precluded from urging their rights by reason of the adverse decision in the original petition. We called for the order of the District Judge in the said original petition and we have allowed that to be exhibited in the appeal. If before an appeal is heard, there is another decision which has become final and which operates as res judicata on the question at issue in the appeal, the appellate Court ought not to refuse to allow the later judgment to be filed. Once it is brought to its notice that there is such a judgment, it is the duty of the appellate Court to allow it to be filed in order to avoid conflicting judgments and further complications. This position is not controverted and we have therefore to see whether the judgment of the District Court in O.P. No. 96 of 1942 precluded us from entertaining the claim of the appellants.

3. The solution of the question depends upon the nature of a proceeding under Section 84(2) of the Act. It is undoubtedly the law that the doctrine of res judicata is not confined to decision in a suit and that the doctrine applies even to decisions rendered in proceedings which are not suits. But how far a decision which is rendered in an original proceeding will bind the parties depends upon other considerations. It is here that Courts have had considerable difficulty in deciding whether the decision rendered in such a proceeding operates as res judicata.

4. We may begin the discussion of this question with the decision of the Judicial Committee in Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 80. A reference was made by the Collector under Section 31 (2)(now Section 30), Land Acquisition Act, 1[I] of 1894. There was no dispute as to the amount of the compensation awarded by the Collector, but there was a dispute as to who was entitled to that amount. There were