1910 Supreme(Mad) 371
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Wallis and Krishnaswamy Aiyar, JJ.
Chintakudy Parvatemma
Versus
Lanka Sanyasi and Anr.
Decided On : 02.08.1910
The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Indian Easements Act, particularly regarding the extinguishment of easements by release, non-enjoyment for twenty years, implied release, and abandonment.
Headnote:
EASEMENTS - Drainage Easement - Indian Easements Act, Section 38, Section 47 - The judgment discusses the provisions of the Indian Easements Act, particularly Section 38 and Section 47, which deal with the extinguishment of easements by release and non-enjoyment for twenty years. The court emphasizes the distinction between continuous and discontinuous easements and highlights the definition of continuous easements under Section 5. The judgment also delves into the interpretation of continuous easements, non-enjoyment, implied release, and abandonment under the Act.
Fact of the Case:
The suit involves a dispute over an easement for drainage, with the plaintiff seeking an injunction to prevent the defendants from obstructing the flow of water from the drain in the plaintiff's land into the defendants' lane. The lower appellate Court found no reliable evidence of the plaintiff's enjoyment of the alleged right, leading to the dispute.
Finding of the Court:
The court analyzed the provisions of the Indian Easements Act and found that the lower appellate Court had not sufficiently considered the Act's provisions in its decision. It emphasized the distinction between continuous and discontinuous easements and the requirements for extinguishment under Section 47. The court also addressed the implied release and abandonment of easements under Section 38, ultimately reversing the decision of the lower appellate Court and restoring that of the Munsif.
Issues: The key issues revolved around the plaintiff's right to the drainage easement, the non-enjoyment of the easement for twenty years, and the application of Sections 38 and 47 of the Indian Easements Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the Indian Easements Act, particularly the provisions related to the extinguishment of easements by release, non-enjoyment for twenty years, implied release, and abandonment. It emphasized the distinction between continuous and discontinuous easements and the requirements for extinguishment under Section 47.
Final Decision: The court reversed the decision of the lower appellate Court and restored that of the Munsif, granting the plaintiff the injunction sought.
Wallis, J.
1. In dealing with this case the lower appellate Court has not sufficiently considered the provisions of the Indian Easements Act, under which an easement may be extinguished by an express or implied release, (Section 38) and also by non-enjoyment for twenty years (Section 47). The latter section distinguished between the case of continuous and discontinuous easementsa continuous easement being defined in Section 5, as one whose enjoyment is, or may be, continual without the act of man." It is well-settled that a drain is a continuous easement, see among other cases Pearson v. Spencer 1 B. & N.S. 571 : 7 Jur. (N.S.) 1195 : 4 L.T. 769 : 3 B. & S. 761 : N.R. 373 : 8 L.T. 166 : 11 W.R. 471, which expressly contrasts continuous easements, such as drains, with discontinuous easements, such as rights of way, also Pyer v. Garter 1 H. & N. 916 : 26 L.J. Ex. 258 : 5 W.R. 371, which has never been questioned on this point. In the case of continuous easements, the period of twenty years under the section begins from the day on which enjoyment was obstructed by the servient owner, or rendered impossible by the dominant owner. Under the sale-deed, Exhibit A dated the 1st April 1374, the plaintiff acquired the right to pass sewage as well as raise water through a sluice to be constructed in his compound at the point now in question, and he still has that right unless it has been released by him (Section 38), or extinguished by prescription (Section 47). The lower appellate Court has found that the plaintiff cannot rely on Exhibit A in the absence of satisfactory proof that she was exercising and enjoying the right of passing sewage water on to the defendants land at the paint in question. This is not a finding either that it has been released or lost by prescription and cannot be accepted as dispasing of the suit. The defendants plea in the written statement was that it has not been the mamool to pass sewage water in this way, that such a right had not been exercised for twenty years, and that the plaintiff had recently enlarged the opening through which rain water used to pass to make it carry sewage water. There is no plea on evidence that enjoyment was obstructed by the servient owner, or rendered impossible by the dominant owner, which could support a finding that the easement was lost by prescription under Section 47 of the Easements Act, nor is there any plea that there was an implied release under Section 38, as to which the Explanation II to the section must be borne in mind, that mere non-user of an easement, that is to say, non-user standing by itself without other evidence of abandonment, is not an implied release within the section, as to which see Seaman v. Vawdrey 16 Yes Jun. 390 : 10 R.R. 207. No defence is shown and the decree of the lower appellate Court must be reversed and that of the District Munsif restored with costs here and the lower appellate Courts.
Krishnasawmy Aiyar, J.
2. The suit is for an injunction to restrain the defendants from obstructing the flow of water from the drain in the plaintiffs land into the defendants lane. Both the plaintiffs land and the defendants lane originally belonged to a common owner. The plaintiff and the defendants have become owners of their respective grounds by purchase. In the sale-deed of 1874 by the common owner to a predeces3or-in-title of the plaintiff, it was provided that the used water and rain water of the site sold, should be made to flow to the street through the sluice to be constructed in the compound wall opposite to the passage." The Subordinate Judge finds, and we are bound to accept his finding in second appeal, that there is no reliable evidence to show that the plaintiff was enjoying and exercising the alleged right, but there is reliable proof that she was not doing so." He observes also that "there is no reliable and satisfactory evidence to show that the provision (alone quoted from Exhibit A) was ever given effect to or the said light was eve