IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Benson and Krishnaswami Ayyar, JJ.
A.L.A.R. Arunachellam Chettiar
Versus
P.S.K. Haji Sheek Meera Rowthar
Decided On : 25.02.1910
ratable distribution - application for execution - Section 295, Section 230, Section 235, Section 490 - The court discussed the interpretation of Section 295 and its application to applications for ratable distribution, as well as the relationship between attachment before judgment and application for execution. The court emphasized that mere application for ratable distribution is not an application for execution as contemplated by Section 295 and that attachment before judgment does not presuppose an application for execution. The judgment also referenced relevant case law to support its conclusion.
Fact of the Case:
The second defendant, the appellant, claimed ratable distribution out of moneys realised in execution of a decree. The present suit was instituted by other decree holders against the same judgment-debtor, raising the question of the second defendant's right to ratable distribution.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the second defendant's mere application for ratable distribution is not an application for execution as contemplated by Section 295. It also concluded that attachment before judgment does not presuppose an application for execution.
Issues: Interpretation of Section 295 and its application to applications for ratable distribution, relationship between attachment before judgment and application for execution.
Ratio Decidendi: Mere application for ratable distribution is not an application for execution as contemplated by Section 295. Attachment before judgment does not presuppose an application for execution.
Final Decision: The second appeal failed and was dismissed with costs.
1. The second defendant who is the appellant before us claims ratable distribution out of moneys realised in execution of the decree in Original Suit No. 681 of 1904 on the file of the District; Munsif of Tinnevelly. In execution of that decree certain moveable properties which belonged to the ninth and tenth defendants were sold. The second defendant who had instituted Original Suit No. 701 of 1904 attached the same properties before judgment. The sale was held on the 10th March 1905, but the-proceeds were realised on various days up to the 1st of April. The second defendant applied for ratable distribution on the 11th March 1905. His application having been allowed the present suit is instituted by other decree holders against the same judgment-debtor, who raise the question as to the second defendants right to ratable distribution. We may aasume, notwithstanding the fact that the sale was held on the day previous to the date of the application for ratable distribution, if that application could be regarded as an application for execution within the meaning of Section 295, that it would entitle the applicant to ratable distribution, as the moneys were, as a matter of fact, realised on various dates subsequent to the second defendants application for ratable distribution; see Ramanathan Chettiar v. Subramania Sastrial and five Ors. I.L.R. (1903) Mad. 129. But there is no authority for the view that a mere application for ratable distribution is an application for execution as contemplated by Section 295. On the other hand, it has been held that it is not, see Ramjus Agarwala v. Guru Charan Sen (1909) 11 Cal. L.J. 69. Section 230 of the Code provides for an application for execution and Section 235 specifies the form and contents of that application, The mere application for ratable distribution therefore which does not comply with the requirements of Section 235 in form or substance cannot be treated as the sort of application for execution falling within the scope of Section 295,
2. It is next argued that the attachment before judgment pre-supposes an application for execution because Section 490 of the Code provides that it shall not be necessary bo reattach the property in execution of the decree where it had been attached before judgment. Section 295 gives the right to ratable distribution only to those who have prior to the realisation applied for execution of decrees for money against the same judgment-debtor-An attachment before judgment of certain property is in no sense an application for execution. It is impossible without specific language justifying it to create a fiction that an attachment before judgment is equivalent to an application for execution of a decree. Section 490 which gives validity and effect to the attachment before judgment even after decree for certain purposes does not give rise to the implication that that attachment was made on a constructive application for execution of a decree that had not been passed, There is no magic in the word "reattach" to be found in Section 490. The attachment before judgment is a fact It does not die with the decree, and all that the section provides is that when there is a subsisting attachment; it is unnecessary to make a second attachment. The section does not make the application to execute the decree a second application to execute-it because it says reattachment is unnecessary. Suppose other property of the judgment-debtor is sold and the proceeds realised, can the decree-holder who has attached before judgment a different property, claim ratable distribution out of the proceeds as one who had applied for execution before realisation? We think the answer must be in the negative. The rights to ratable, distribution is conferred upon every decree-holder who has applied for execution, whether the relief claimed by him is the arrest of the judgment-debtor or the attachment and sale of any property or the sale of property already attached before judgment. W
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