The main legal point established in the judgment is the recognition of the legal right of kanom-holders to seek renewal and the application of the doctrine of constructive notice in property possession and agreements.

Anantakrishna Aiyar, J.

1. 2nd and 3rd defendants were holding certain properties under a janmi. On the 28th January, 1909, the 2nd defendant executed in favour of the 1st, Ex. I, called "kanom-kuzhikanom mortgage" document, under which the 1st defendant was entitled to hold the properties till the 28th January, 1921. Subsequently the 2nd defendant received some renewal fee from the 1st and executed on the 19th December, 1918, Ex. III, in his (1st defendants) favour. The 2nd defendant seems to have subsequently changed his mind and executed in favour of the plaintiff a melcharth, Ex. A, on the 5th January, 1919. After the expiry of the period covered by Ex. I, the plaintiff on the basis of Ex. A instituted O.S. No. 419 of 1921 to redeem Ex. I. The 1st defendant contested the suit, and relied on an agreement by the 2nd defendant to renew Ex. I, and produced Ex. III to evidence the said agreement; he also pleaded that the 2nd defendant had, as a matter of fact, executed a renewal of the kanom-kuzhikanom deed in his favour on the 19th December, 1920, Ex. II.

2. The plaintiff succeeded in the trial Court, but on appeal the learned District Judge reversed the first Courts decree. He found that Ex. III was a genuine document, and that the plaintiff must be taken to have had notice of the agreement entered into between the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant with reference to the granting of the renewal by the 2nd defendant in favour of the 1st. From the dismissal of the suit by the Lower Appellate Court, the plaintiff preferred a second appeal to this Court, and the learned Judge--Ramesam, J.--before whom the second appeal came on for hearing held that Ex. III should be taken to evidence only an agreement to renew and that the appellants contention that it was a demise by itself should not be accepted. The learned Judge also found that the finding of the Lower

3. Appellate Court on the question of notice on the part of the plaintiff of the agreement, Ex. III, should be upheld. He also held that having regard to the fact that the 1st defendant was in possession of the properties under a kanom kuzhikanom deed, and having regard to the agreement entered into between the 1st defendant and the 2nd, the plaintiff was bound to have inquired into the rights of the 1st defendant in the circumstances and not having done so the plaintiffs melcharth document, Ex. A, should not be allowed to prevail over the 1st defendants rights. In the result the learned Judge dismissed the second appeal. The present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by the plaintiff against that decision of the learned Judge.

4. Before noticing the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate for the appellant, I may say, that I agree with the opinion of Ramesam, J., that "Ex. III could not operate as a present demise and that it is admissible in evidence though unregistered, and that the parties did not intend a demise until payment of the balance manusham of Rs. 5-1-3 by the 1st defendant.

5. It was first contended before us by the learned Advocate on behalf of the plaintiff that having regard to certain decisions of this Court a lessee in the position of the 1st defendant, whose term had expired, but who had an agreement of renewal in his favour could not for that reason withstand a suit for possession brought by a lessor or a purchaser from the lessor, and it was argued that the decision of the learned Judge in this case is not correct. Our attention was drawn to the decisions reported in Achutan Nambudri v. Koman Nair (1902) 13 M.L.J. 217. Gopalan Nair v. Kunhan Menon I.L.R. (1907) 30 M. 300 : 17 M.L.J. 189 and Kanna Kurup v. Sankara Varma Rajah I.L.R. (1920) 44 M. 344. With reference to this argument it has to be observed that while the tenants (1st defendants) possession by itself, though coupled with an agreement to renew, would not be a complete defence to a suit for possession by a person in the position of the plaintiff in the circumstances, yet as was pointed