Section 4 of the Limitation Act enables the plaintiff to exclude the time during which the Court is closed and institute the suit on the re-opening day, without extending the period of limitation beyond the prescribed period.

Vepa Ramesam, Kt. Officiating C.J.

1. The facts out of which this Letters Patent Appeal arises are as follow:

2. The suit was filed on an unregistered bond, dated 26th February, 1915. The bond was taken in favour of a minor by his guardian. The minor attained majority on 12th May, 1920 and computing three years provided under Section 6 of the Limitation Act, the suit ought to have been filed on or within the 12th May, 1923. But on that date the District Munsifs Court of Peddapur was closed and so the suit was filed on the re-opening day, i.e., 4th June, 1923. The Subordinate Judge held that the suit was in time, and on second appeal our brother Reilly, J., agreed with the Subordinate Judges view. This Letters Patent Appeal is filed against the judgment of Reilly, J. The question is whether Section 4 of the Limitation Act can be utilised after getting an extension by reason of the provisions of Section 6 of the Limitation Act.

3. I may at once observe that there is no direct decision on the point. The learned advocates have referred us to decisions with reference to Section 4 and other sections which have a possible bearing. First we have got a decision in Namsimha Deo Garu v. Krishimchendra Deo Garu (1919)37MLJ256 . In that case two brothers--members of a joint family--filed a suit to recover their share of the zamindari. It was found that the 1st plaintiff attained majority more than three years and two months prior to suit and that the suit was barred by reason of the two plaintiffs being members of a joint family on the application of Section 7 of the Limitation Act. But apart from this ground, there was a further ground on which the learned Judges Abdur Rahim and Spencer, JJ., held that the 2nd plaintiffs claim was barred, viz., that the period of two months which is the period of notice of suit given under Section 49 of the Court of Wards Act cannot be deducted under Section 15 (2), while the plaintiffs had the benefit of the three years allowed under sections 6 and 8. That decision is distinguishable for Section 15 and Sections 12 to 14 and 16 deal with computing periods of limitation and provide for the exclusion of certain periods in such computation. I also entertain some doubts about the correctness of the second ground of the decision. Nor has Section 4 anything to do with computation of the period of limitation. After making all the necessary computations, if the period expires on a day when the Court is closed Section 4 permits the suit to be filed on the re-opening day. The indulgence given by Section 4 does not depend upon any computation. Therefore, the decisions under the sections which deal with the computation of the period of limitation ought not to be used in connection with Section 4.

4. Another case relied on is a decision in Shevdas Daulatram v. Narayen I.L.R. (1911) 36 B 268. The question there was whether Section 4 of the Limitation Act can be utilised in cases where the party gets the benefit of Section 31 and it was held that it could not be so utilised. But this decision has been dissented from in Murugesa Mudali v. Kaniasmni Chettiar (1913) 26 M.L.J. 23 and Sotnisetti Seshayya Chetty v. Rolla Subbpdu AIR1930Mad991 , where all the decisions are collected, and it appears that other High Courts also have dissented from it. We are inclined to agree with all these decisions in dissenting from the case in Shevdas Daulatram v. Narayen I.L.R. (1911) 36 B 268.

5. The next case referred to is a decision in Subbarayan v. Natarajan I.L.R. (1922) 45 M. 785 : 43 M.L.J. 168. In that case at page 795 after putting the question "What is meant by a period of limitation?" I observed:

In the first place it probably does not include mere periods of extension, such as the period of two years under Section 31 of the Limitation Act, (quoting here Dayaram v. Laxman (1911)13BOMLR284 and the period of three years referred to in Section 8 of the Limitation Act (quoting the case in Narasimha Deo Garu v. Krishnachendra Deo G