The central legal point established in the judgment is that the nature of the provocation and the subsequent actions of the accused are crucial in determining the appropriate offence and sentence.

1. Two questions arise in this appeal. The first is what offence has been committed; the second, what the sentence should be. The appellant does not deny that he killed his mistress a woman called Mahalakshmi, but he pleads that he did so in consequence of grave and sudden provocation. The Judge has found that he discovered the woman in the arms of a former lover (P. W. 17), lest control of himself and stabbed her. The finding is probably correct. P. W. 17 admitted to the police that he was seated on Mahalakshmis cot when the appellant entered the hut but not that she was in his arms. As he admitted further that she had solicited him, it is difficult to believe his pretence that he had refused her advances. On this finding, the Judge came to the conclusion that the offence committed was one Under Section 302, I.P. C. He was of opinion that though the provocation was sudden it was not so grave as to justify him in convicting of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. This opinion he based on the fact that Mahalakshmi was the appellants mistress. Had she been his wife, his conclusion would have been different and more favourable to the appellant. We find it impossible to agree that the fact that Mahalakshmi was the appellants mistress and not his wife makes any real difference. One cannot supply considerations of social morality to a purely psychological problem. The question is not whether the appellant ought to have exercised, but whether he lost control over himself. When a man sees a woman be she his wife or his mistress, in the arms of another man be does not stop to consider whether he has or has not the right to insist on exclusive possession of her person as the case cited by the Judge puts it. She is a woman, of whose person he desires to be in exclusive possession and that is for the moment, enough for him, he thinks of nothing else. The question in each particular case is whether the circumstances are such as to justify the Court in giving the accused the benefit of the exception. In the present instance we should have altered the conviction to one Under Section 304, I.P.C. but for two circumstances. It is in evidence that after P. W. 17 had escaped the appellant fastened the door of the hut and he admits himself that having no knife in his hands he removed some baskets from the top of his box, opened it and took out the knife with which he committed the murder. All this must have taken some time and indicates a certain amount of preparation for an intended murder. Had he taken a knife from his belt and used it at once it would have been a different matter. As it is, we chink that he has been rightly convicted and sentenced. The conviction and sentence are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed.