The absence of the wife does not make the pronouncement of talak void and inefficacious, and the fact of the pronouncement of talak should come to her notice for the purpose of dower.

Venkatasubba Rao, J.

1. The parties are Sunni Mahomedana belonging to the Hanafi subject. The question I have to decide is whether the claim of the wife (the plaintiff) for deferred dower is barred by limitation under Article 104, Lim. Act. That article reads thus:

By a Mahomodan Three When the mar- for deferred dower. years. riage is dissolved by death or divorce.

2. The husband (the defendant) pleads that the talak was validly effected more than three years before the suit and that it is therefore barred. The Munsif overruled this contention and gave judgment for plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge, finding that the claim was barred by limitation, dismissed the suit.

3. The Subordinate Judge finds that the defendant pronounced a valid talak on 21st July 1919 and requested the Kazi to communicate the fact to the plaintiff who was informed of it by that official on 24th August. On these findings he has held that there was a valid divorce on 21st July 1919 and that the suit filed on 25th July 1922 was barred. The District Munsif has, on the other hand, found that the talak was pronounced on 21st August and held that the suit was within time.

4. The Kazi communicated the fact of the divorce by Ex. A dated 24th August, written by him to the plaintiffs father. It is common ground that so far as that letter goes, the divorce is stated to have been effected on 21st August and not on 21st July. The Kazi explains that he was informed by the defendant that the talak was effected on 21st July, but that it was due to a slip" on his own part that the date was wrongly given as 21st August. The District Munsif has refused to act upon this statement and, as I have said, found that the talak was actually effected only on 21st August. The lower appellate Court has accepted the Kazis explanation. Dr. John, for the appellant, contends that the finding of the Subordinate Judge is perverse and that it is open to me in second appeal to set it aside, although the question is one of fact. In the view I take it is unnecessary to decide whether the finding is perverse or not, for I proceed upon the footing that the Subordinate Judges conclusions of fact are correct, namely that the talak was pronounced in the absence of the wife on 21st July and that fact was communicated to her on 24th August. On these findings, in my opinion, the suit is not barred by limitation. It is now settled law that the absence of the wife does not make the pronouncement of talak void and inefficacious, for the husband may pronounce a valid talak in her absence. Sarabai v. Rabibai [1906]30 Bom.537, Fulchand v. Nawab Ali Choudhary [19091 36 Cal. 184, Ashabibi v. Kadir Ibrahim Rowther [1910]33 Mad.22, Rajasaheb Rasul Saheb In Re [1920]44 Bom.44 and Ma Mi v. Kallander Ammal But on the question whether the talak takes effect only after it comes to the notice of the wife, there seems to be some uncertainty. Ameer Ali in his Mahomedan Law states the law thus:

It is not necessary for the husband himself to pronounce the talak in the presence of the wife, but it is necessary that it should come to her knowledge. If a talak is given by letter, it will take effect on the receipt of the letter by the wife. If the letter reaches her father and he tears it to pieces there will be no talak unless the father transacts all her business, is, in fact, her agent, and resides in the same house with her. If the father should inform the wife of the receipt of the letter and deliver to her the torn pieces thereof, the talak will take effect only if the letter can be read and understood: 4th Edn, Vol. II, p. 514.

5. In Sarabai v Rabibai [1906] 30 Bom.537 Batchelor, J., makes the following observations On the contrary, the authorities show that a bain talak, such as this, reduced to manifest and customary writing, takes effect immediately on the mere writing; see e. g., Baillie, p. 233; Moulvi Mahomed Yusoof, Vol. III, p. 95. The divorce being absolute, it is effected as soon as the words are written,