Ramesam, J.

1. The facts out of which this second appeal arises may be stated as follows. The respondent Lakshmi Animal obtained a deed of maintenance from her deceased husbands brothers in 1918, under which a house was charged with the payment of the maintenance to her. The owners of the house also executed a second mortgage of it in 1922. As the maintenance was not paid up to the year 1927, Lakshmi Animal filed a suit, O.S. No. 454 of 1927, without making the second mortgagee a party and obtained a decree. In execution of the decree she was appointed receiver on 27th January, 1930, for realisation of the profits of the house and appropriating the same towards her decree. She got possession of the house in April, 1930. The second mortgagee filed a suit on his mortgage, O.S. No. 12 of 1928, without making Lakshmi Animal a party and obtained a decree and got the property sold. It was purchased by Nagendram Chetty, the appellant before us, on 28th January, 1931. He sought to obtain possession of the property but was resisted by the respondent. The appellant applied to the District Munsif under Order 21, Rule 97, Civil Procedure Code, for the removal of the respondents obstruction. The application was allowed by the District Munsif. There was an appeal to the District Judge of Trichinopoly. The District Judge allowed Lakshmi Ammals appeal. Nagendram Chetty files this second appeal. When the case came on for disposal before Madhavan Nair, J., he referred the matter to a bench of two Judges. When the case accordingly came on before Jackson, J. and Mockett, J., it was thought that there was some conflict between Chinnu Pillai v. Venkatasamy Chettiar I.L.R.(1915) Mad. 77 : 30 M.L.J. 347 and Chinnaswami Padayachi v. Darmalinga Padayachi (1932) 63 M.L. 394 and they referred the matter to a Full Bench. The case accordingly came on before us.

2. The first point to be noticed in the case is what the question now between the parties is, - who is entitled to possession until a regular suit is filed in which the two mortgage rights are brought face to face and can be worked out? The plaintiff-receiver in the first suit was the first mortgagee and is also entitled to possession by reason of the order of the Court appointing her a receiver for realisation of the mortgage amount. The purchaser in execution of the decree in the second suit stands in the shoes of the second mortgagee. By the general law a second mortgagee is entitled to redeem the first mortgagee. The first mortgagee before selling the property ought to afford an opportunity to the second mortgagee to redeem the first. Only after such an opportunity is given and not utilised can the first mortgagee sell the property free of both the mortgages for the realisation of the mortgage debt. Similarly the second mortgagee in suing on his mortgage might have impleaded the first mortgagee either offering to redeem the mortgage, or asking for the sale of the property subject to the mortgage, or praying for sale of the property free of both mortgages and a direction that the prior mortgagees debt be first paid off and the amount due to himself should be paid out of the balance. Unfortunately the second mortgagee was not a party in the suit of the first mortgagee and the first mortgagee was not a party in the suit of the second mortgagee. Thus up to now there has been no suit in which the two mortgagees, or persons who stand in the position of the mortgagees, have been brought face to face so as to enable them to work out the rights under the mortgages according to the principles of law applicable to successive mortgages. Such a suit has yet to be filed. The question in this case is, - who, in the meanwhile, i.e., until such a suit settles the dispute between the parties finally, is entitled to possession? Prior to the decrees the mortgagors were the persons entitled to possession, the mortgagees being only simple mortgagees. By the order of appointment of Lakshmi Ammal as receiver she