The central legal point established in the judgment is the principle of pious obligation, extending the sons' liability for their father's debts in a Hindu coparcenary, irrespective of the family composition.

Curgenven, J.

1. The plaintiff, who appeals, sued upon a promissory note executed by one Narayya Appa Rao. Narayya Appa Rao died and the suit was brought against his father, the 1st defendant, and his sons, the 2nd and 3rd defendants, these three defendants forming a Hindu coparcenary. The question arose whether each and every one of these defendants could be made liable in respect of their shares of the family property. The learned Subordinate Judge tried the question whether the debt was borrowed by Narayya Appa Rao in his capacity as family manager and for family necessity, and answered it in the negative. He further came to the conclusion that the debt was not contracted for any illegal or immoral purpose, and the findings upon these issues have not been controverted before us. Notwithstanding the finding upon the latter issue, the learned Subordinate Judge has come to the conclusion that the shares of the 2nd and 3rd defendants, i.e., the sons of the executant of the note, are not liable for the debt, and that is the question arising in this appeal. His view is that the pious obligation of a son to discharge his fathers debt does not extend to a case where the family consists not merely of father and sons but of collaterals as well, though in the present instance the 1st defendant can hardly be described as a collateral but as an ascendant. The principle contended for before us, which is virtually the same as that adopted by the Subordinate Judge, is that only where the father happens to be the family manager, will the sons share in the family property be liable for the debt. The leading case dealing with the question of pious obligation is Brij Narain v. Mangal Prasad. At the close of the judgment, the Privy Council have summarised their conclusions upon that and cognate points in five paragraphs. This case has been made the subject of comment by Srinivasa Aiyangar, J. in Subramania Ayyar v. Sabapathy Aiyar I.L.R. (1927) 51 Mad. 361 : 54 M.L.J. 726. That was the Full Bench case which decided that the pre-partition debts of the father are binding upon the sons shares after a bona fide partition. In delivering one of the minority judgments the learned Judge took occasion to discuss the meaning of the Privy Councils pronouncement in the case just cited and came to the conclusion that it was to be read as meaning that only when the father is the managing coparcener can the creditor proceed against the sons share. The same view was at one time held by two learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court in Ayodhia Prasad v. Data Ram AIR1931All131 , that also being a case where the grandfather was still alive when the question of the liability of the sons for the personal debt of the father arose. This case however was subsequently considered by a Full Bench decision reported in Bankey Lal v. Durga Prasad AIR1931All512 , of which the two learned Judges, Sulaiman, Ag. C.J. and Young, J., who had decided the previous case, were members and occasion was taken to reconsider the former decision and the Bench concluded that it had not been correctly decided. It is certainly difficult to understand upon what logical basis the principle of a sons pious obligation should be identified with the liability of a coparcener of a joint undivided estate for a family debt contracted by the manager. Whatever connection may be discovered between the first two paragraphs of the Privy Council summary of their principles, we think that a perusal of the text of the judgment will make it amply clear that the two doctrines with which they are dealing and which they describe as " seemingly conflicting principles" are regarded as quite distinct and as based upon two entirely different foundations. A still more recent case of the Allahabad High Court, Lalta Prasad v. Gajadhar AIR1933All235 , is a direct authority for the view that even where the family consists of other members than the father and the sons the pious obligation still arises. Iqbal Ahmad,