The judgment established the principle that the interpretation of wills and property rights should be in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, specifically Section 106, to determine vested interests.

Sundaram Chetty, J.

1. This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff (appellant) for the recovery of a certain sum of money alleged to be due on a mortgage bond executed by the 1st defendant for Rs. 1,000 on 15th November, 1924. The 2nd defendant is a subsequent purchaser of the mortgaged property from the 1st defendant. Various contentions were raised by these defendants in respect of which issues were also framed, but the learned Judge in the Court below wanted to dispose of the suit on what he calls two preliminary points, one of which he decided definitely against the plaintiff. On the strength of that finding, the suit was dismissed. Hence this appeal.

2. The mortgaged property belonged to the 1st defendants grandfather Srinivasa Chettiar. The 1st defendants right to that property is derived from the will, Ex. I, executed by the said Srinivasa Chettiar in 1904. The contention of the 2nd defendant is that according to the terms of that will it should be taken that the mortgaged property had not vested in the 1st defendant on the date of the suit mortgage and consequently the mortgage sued on is invalid. The Lower Court upheld this contention and dismissed the suit.

3. This question depends upon a proper construction of the terms of the will, Ex. I. Under this will, the testator appointed three persons as executors for the purpose of carrying out the directions contained in the will. The present 1st defendant, who was then a child of 4 or 5 months, was to be under the protection of his mother and paternal grandmother who were both appointed under the will as the guardians of his person. The testator had a son named Ramaswami Chetti who was aged about 20 years but he was practically disinherited on account of his improper conduct. Paragraph 13 of the will is important for the purposes of the present case. It provides that for a period of three years subsequent to the death of the testator the executors should manage the properties as directed in the will and after the expiry of that period they should deliver to the 1st defendants guardians all the movable and immovable properties which should be taken possession of and managed by those two guardians till the end of their lifetime without any power of alienation by sale or mortgage, but after their lifetime the testators sons descendants should take those properties absolutely and enjoy them from generation to generation. The effect of the aforesaid terms of the will appears to be this. After the expiry of a term of three years from the date of the testators death during which the executors should be in possession and management, the two ladies who were appointed as the 1st defendants guardians were to enjoy the properties for their life without powers of alienation. In other words, a life-estate was bequeathed to them with an absolute gift over of the remainder to the descendants of the testators son. The absolute gift of the remainder is to a specified class of persons of whom the 1st defendant is certainly one. The question for consideration is, whether the gift of the remainder absolutely in favour of a specified class of persons on the termination of the life-estate should be deemed to be a vested interest or only a contingent interest. The ordinary distinction between vested and contingent interests consists in the nature of the event or condition upon which the done should take the property. If the interest created in favour of a person should take effect on the happening of an event which must happen, it is a vested interest, but if it is to take effect on the happening of a specified uncertain event which may or may not happen the interest is a contingent one. Applying this test there is no doubt about the nature of the interest created in favour of the class of persons of whom the 1st defendant is one, which should take effect on the termination of the life-time of the two ladies (an event which must happen). It seems to me that the 1st defendant as