The central legal point established in the judgment is the application of Section 52, T.P. Act in determining the status of the plaintiff's purchase in a property dispute involving a mortgage and execution proceedings.

Walsh, J.

1. The plaintiff is the appellant. The suit relates to two items of property. The A schedule property belongs to one Kuppuswami Padayaehi and was sold to the appellant and two others on 9th December 1922 (Ex. C). The other two vendees sold their share to the plaintiff on 19th December 1923 (Ex. D). The B schedule property belonging to one Thangavelu Padayachi was sold to the plaintiff on 27th June 1923 (Ex. E). The properties were sold as free of encumbrance. But plaintiff found that they were both subject to a mortgage on 17th August 1917 for Rs. 460 in favour of defendant 1, the Co-operative Rural Credit Society of Ulakottai Village, Default having been made under the mortgage to the Co-operative Society, it proceeded by C.C.S. 1 of 1922 to obtain an award from the Assistant Registrar of Co operative Societies. An award was passed on 31st August 1922 directing the mortgagor to pay the amount. It was filed in Court with an execution petition, E.P. No. 1650 of 1922, on 17th November 1922. Under this execution petition the properties were sold on 21st November 1923, and the Society purchased the hypotheca. The sale was confirmed on 22nd February 1924. Plaintiff wanted to redeem the properties but his-right was denied and it was said that his vendors right to redeem had disappeared. The sale to the plaintiff was subsequent to the filing of the execution-petition on 17th November 1922, and the-main question at issue is whether his purchase was pendente lite or not. Respondent 2 is the subsequent purchaser from the Society and his defence is the same as that of the Society. The trial Court held that the proceedings under Ex. 1 before the Registrar were proceedings before a Court and therefore attracted the provisions of Section 52, T.P. Act. On appeal fathe Subordinate Judge held that the proceedings before the Registrar were not proceedings before a Court and therefore Section 52 does not apply, but he held that the execution proceedings on the award were proceedings under Section 52 and therefore the plaintiffs purchase was pendente lite. Against this decision this second appeal has been filed.

2. It may be more convenient first to discuss the matter from the respondents standpoint since they contend that thet trial Court was correct in considering that the proceedings before the Registrar were proceedings before a Court. If that is made out, except for a general argument, which was not raised at all in the Courts below, and to which I shall allude; later on, it is clear that the plaintiffs purchase was pendente lite. There is one direct decision of this Court that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies is a Court for purposes of Section 195, Criminal P.C: In re Subbiah Beddi AIR 1930 Mad 869. It, is a decision, no doubt, of a Single Judge and is confined to Section 195, Criminal P. C, but it is on the exact point, and there is no decision to the contrary by this Court. In Nanda Lal Ganguli v. Khatra Mohan Ghose AIR 1918 Cal 932 it was held that a tribunal constituted by the Calcutta Improvement Act is a Court within the meaning: of Section 195, Criminal P. C. In Queen-Empress v. Munda Shetti (1901) 24 Mad 121, it was held that a Tahsildar inquiring into revenue registry is a revenue Court, and in In re Nataraja Iyer (1913) 36 Mad 72 held that a Divisional Officer hearing appeals under the Income Tax Act, is a Court. In Gopinath v. Ramnath AIR1925All356 it was remarked that the Registrar of Cooperative Societies or the arbitrators appointed by him are given the powers of a civil Court for the purposes of summoning witnesses and that it is laid down that their award shall be enforceable by a civil Court in the same manner as if it were a decree passed by such a Court.

3. For the appellant it is pointed out that an Official Assignee is not a Court, Beard-sell & Co. v. Abdul Gunni Sahib AIR 1914 Mad 474, nor is a Registrar of Assurances in registering a will a Court for the purpose of rendering a statement made by a