The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of an oral agreement for lease under the provisions of Section 107, T.P. Act, and the determination of whether it constitutes a present transfer of an interest in the immovable property.

Beasley, C.J.

1. This is an appeal from a judgment of Stone, J., which, as our learned brother says, raises a very interesting point of law. It relates to an oral agreement or arrangement entered into on 13th July 1931 between the plaintiff-appellant and the defendant-respondent. This agreement was for a lease for three years; and the question for consideration is whether it is an agreement within the provisions of Section 107, T.P. Act, which provides that a lease of Immovable property for any period exceeding one year can be made only by a registered instrument, and that all other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered Instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Turning to Section 105 a lease is therein defined as follows:

A lease of Immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property.

2. In this case the lease was of immovable property for a term of three years : and it was contended on the defendants behalf at the trial that the agreement in question was a present transfer of a right to enjoy Immovable property within the provisions of Section 105 and therefore being for a term exceeding one year, necessitated a registered document by reason of Section 107, T.P. Act. This-was raised as a preliminary question. Stone, J. upheld the defendants contention. It is necessary, first of all, to state a few facts. The appellant purchased the property in question on 5th September 1930. The respondent was* then in possession of the property from the vendor under a tenancy which was to end on 30th September 1931. On 13th July 1931 the respondent entered into the oral agreement in question here. That agreement, according to the appellants evidence, was, as already stated, to give the respondent a three years lease. At the same time it was agreed1 that the rental was to be Rs. 315 per month, that the respondent should pay the costs of manuring the trees and ploughing the garden, that he should also pay the appellant an advance of two months rent and that the monthly rent should be paid thereafter by the 2nd of every succeeding month. The lease was to commence on 1st October 1931. All these matters were settled on 13th July 1931 and on the same date the advance of two months rent was paid to the appellant amounting to Rs. 630, being the rent for October and November 1931. Later on a draft lease deed1 was prepared. This was sometime in August 1931. According to the appellant it was at the request of the respondent that he prepared the draft lease deed.

3. It was handwritten and sent to the respondent for his approval on 22n&. August 1931. The respondent came with it to the appellant and wanted certain alterations to be made in it. These alterations he had already made, but in addition to those he wanted two other alterations as well and these were made, and the deed never got beyond that stage. The respondent refused thereafter to execute the lease.

4. The question is what were the intentions of the parties when the oral agreement of 13th July was entered into. The appellants contention is that it was on that date agreed that a lease should be given, that is to say, at some future date. The respondents contention, on the other hand, is that all the details were agreed upon on that date and that the only agreement as regards the future was that a deed in pursuance of this agreement should formally be drawn up. I think that from the evidence on the plaintiffs side it is quite clear that all the details were settled orally on 13th July 1931. Stone, J., received evidence in order to ascertain whether on the facts the oral agreement in question was an agreement of lease within Section 105, T.P. Act, or whether it was an agreement which on certain authorities before him could be distinguished from a lease or transfer so as to take the case out of Section 107, T.P. Act. The authorities to which he referred were amongst others, Chunilal Dutt v. Gopiram Bhotica AIR1927Cal275 , wh