1933 Supreme(Mad) 91
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Walsh, J.
K.P. Ganapathy Iyer
Versus
K.P. Subramania Iyer and Ors.
Decided On : 23.02.1933
The interpretation of the language used in the compromise decree, the admissibility of evidence to explain ambiguity, and the division of properties in accordance with the compromise were the central legal points established in the judgment.
Headnote:
Partition - Interpretation of Compromise Decree - Kottekkad properties - 100 paras of paddy - Division in proportion of 385 to 185 - Use of Malayalam word 'veedham' - Admissibility of evidence - Division of forest land - Final Decision
Fact of the Case:
The case involves the interpretation of a compromise decree in a partition suit between two brothers, regarding the division of properties in Kottekkad and the payment of 100 paras of paddy annually for performing Sradhas.
Finding of the Court:
The District Munsif held that the properties should be divided equally and the defendant is liable to pay 100 paras of paddy annually. The District Judge took the view that the Kottekkad land was to be divided in the proportion of 385 to 185.
Issues: The main issue was the interpretation of the compromise decree, specifically the meaning of the word 'veedham' in Malayalam and the admissibility of evidence to explain the ambiguity.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the use of the Malayalam word 'veedham' and the division of forest land as key factors in interpreting the compromise decree.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the order of the District Munsif was restored, except for the decision on what happens after the death of the plaintiff regarding the 100 paras of paddy payable for the shradha, which was left open for future consideration.
Walsh, J.
1. The appellant is the judgment-debtor in this case and the matter arises in the execution of a compromise decree. Plaintiff 1 and defendant 1 are brothers and in a suit for partition a decree was drawn up in accordance with the compromise between them. The suit turns upon the construction of para. 3 of this compromise decree relating to the properties in Kottekkad. The paragraph has been translated as follows:
It has been settled that out of the abovementioned properties the house at Kumarapuram gramom should be taken for the share No. 1 out of us, that the properties in Kollengode and Mangalam areas should be partitioned by both the persons equally, and that the revenue and michavaroms in respect of the said properties should be borne equally; and since the obsequies of our grandmother deceased Subbammal Ammal were conducted by No. 2, No. 1 has of his own free will, agreed and settled that in respect of the Sradhams (death anniversaries), etc., of the said grandmother and of grandfather deceased Venkatasubba Ayyar, 100 paras of paddy should be credited to No. 2 from the share of 285 paras of paddy belonging to No. 1 out of 570 paras of paddy that is left as balance after deducting 130 paras of paddy for ushappooja and nivedia vazhipad, at the Venkatachapathi temple at Kumarapuram gramom, from the pattom (rent) of about 700 paras of paddy which the properties in Kottekkad amsom now fetch; and so, the abovesaid 100 paras of paddy has been set apart for the share of No. 2 from the share of 285 paras of paddy belonging to No. 1. It has also been settled that the properties at Kottekkad should be partitioned in the said proportion.
2. The question at issue is whether the properties at Kottekkad are to be divided into two equal portions out of which the defendant-appellant is to pay 100 paras of paddy per annum to the plaintiff for performing the Sradha of their maternal grandfather and grandmother or whether the properties are to be divided in the ratio of 385 to 185 which represents the final numbers of paras of paddy which each side will have for its own use when another 130 paras of paddy have been deducted for the temple which is to be paid by each party in equal shares of 65 paras a piece. The learned District Munsif held that the properties should be divided equally and that defendant 1 is liable under the Razi to pay 100 paras of paddy every year to plaintiff 1 for performing the Sradhas till his death after which the Sradhas would cease to be performed. The learned District Judge took the other view that the Kottekkad land was to be divided in the proportion of 385 to 185, and against his decision this second, appeal has been filed.
3. It is unnecessary to deal with the question, which has been raised whether the compromise was a preliminary or a final decree because both the parties have treated it as a final decree. In a consent decree no preliminary decree is obligatory in a partition suit, and the parties having by means of an execution petition treated it as a final decree, it is not open to either of them now to object that it is only a preliminary decree: Vishnu Sakharam v. Krishna Rao Malhar (1887) 11 Bom. 153 followed in Gurudeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh (1909) 36 Cal 193 . I therefore come to the main point as to which, view of the compromise is right. And in this matter I wish to say at once that I understand Malayalam is the mother tongue of the learned District Munsif whereas the learned District Judge was a European. I would also put in the forefront of this discussion the fact that in the crucial phrase:
It has been settled that the properties at Kottekkad should be partitioned in the said proportion, the use of the word "proportion" in the translation is unfortunate and really begs the question. The Malayalam word is "veedham" and that word has not the exclusive mathematical connotation which "proportion" or "ratio" has in English. The word "veedham" is certainly not confined to the sense of