IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Walsh, J.
Manathanath Kolongara Veetil Adambat Gopalan Nair
Versus
Dist. Board of Malabar
Decided On : 24.03.1933
Toll-Gate Contractor - Contractual Liability - Para. 6, Para. 3, Para. 7 of the conditions of lease - Section 107, Contract Act - Section 39, Contract Act - Section 63, Contract Act - Interest Act - Damages and Interest in Resale
Fact of the Case:
The defendant, a toll-gate contractor, defaulted on a contract due to the Moplah rebellion. The District Board sued for the balance of the contract amount and interest. The main issues were limitation and interest on the deficit in resale.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the suit was time-barred as the notice of resale put an end to the contract, and interest could not be awarded on the deficit in resale. The court analyzed the relevant contract clauses, Contract Act sections, and legal principles to reach its decision.
Issues: The issues were the correct date for limitation, the applicability of Contract Act sections, and the award of interest on the deficit in resale.
Ratio Decidendi: The court applied Para. 6, Para. 3, and Para. 7 of the conditions of lease, Section 107 and Section 39 of the Contract Act, and the Interest Act to determine the limitation and interest issues. It held that the notice of resale ended the contract and interest could not be awarded on the deficit in resale.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the suit was dismissed with costs.
Walsh, J.
1. The defendant in this appeal is a toll-gate contractor. He had rented a toll at Tamarasseri for 1921-22 for a sum of Rs. 7,500. The contract was to run from 1st April 1921 to 31st March 1922. He defaulted in October 1921, owing to the Moplah rebellion. In all he paid for the contract amount Rs. 3,300. The District Board of Malabar (plaintiff) granted a remission of Rs. 2,000. The Board exercised its option of resale which was held on 26th October 1921, but at which there were no bidders. A second sale was held on 10th December 1921. The resale resulted in a loss of Rs. 2,795. Deducting the Rs. 2,000 remitted the Board sued for the balance of Rs. 795 with interest at "the stipulated rate of 12 per cent."
2. Various contentions were raised of which the only two which arise in second appeal are the questions of limitation and the matter of interest. As regards limitation the trial Court found that the suit which was brought on 12th November 1924 was time-barred and dismissed it. On appeal the lower appellate Court held that the suit was in time and gave a decree to the District Board. Against this decree the defendant has filed this appeal. The question of limitation arises in this way. Under para. 6 of the conditions of lease, if a kist be not paid on or before the date fixed in the patta it will be regarded as an arrear after that date, and interest at 12 per cent per annum will be charged on it for the actual number of days of default; and the toll will be liable to be resold or conducted under amani subject to the conditions mentioned in para. 3.
3. Para. 3 says that the farm will be resold at the purchasers risk or conducted under amani. It says:
In either case the deposit shall be forfeited and the purchaser will have no claim to any excess that may be realized by the second sale and will be held responsible for any deficit that may result by such resale.
4. Para. 7 runs
If a re-sale is ordered, the President may, at his discretion, conduct the toll under amani or permit the original purchaser to conduct it during the period between the order for the resale of the farm and the confirmation of the resale.
5. It may be noted that para. 3 does not create a liability for deficit if the toll is conducted under amani during the period of amani. The suit was brought more than three years after the first attempted sale on 10th December 1921, but within three years after the actual sale on 26th December 1921, and the question is, which is the correct date from which to reckon limitation?
6. It is quite clear from paras. 6 and 7 that once resale is ordered, the lessee loses any further benefit of the contract except in so far as the President may permit him to continue conducting the collection of the toll. Therefore the order for resale is a clear indication that the promisee had put an end to the contract owing to the default of the promisor. The learned District Munsif has held, and I think rightly, that it is not open to the promisee to use his discretion in putting off the date of the re-sale and thereby depriving the defendant of the plea of limitation, although in this particular case the adjournment of the sale was probably made in the interests of defendant 1. It is argued for, the appellant; that such a re-sale was merely for ascertainment of damages and will not affect the starting point of limitation. 19 Halsbury, p. 42, Section 64 says, In the action for a breach of contract the cause of action is the breach. Accordingly such an action must be brought within six years of the breach; after the expiration of that period the action will be barred, although damage may have accrued to the plaintiff within six years of action brought. In such an action it is not necessary to prove actual damage, and special damage is merely alleged as a measure of the damages to be recovered. The time is not extended by the fact that the breach had not been discovered, or that damage has not resulted until after the expiration of
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