The main legal point established in the judgment is that gifts of family property to daughters, including those made by uncles, are valid under Hindu Law if they are of a reasonable amount and do not excessively prejudice the rights of the sons.

1. The question of law raised in this second appeal is whether a deed of gift executed by the plaintiffs father in favour of the 1st defendant, the daughter of the donors deceased undivided brother, is valid and binding as against the plaintiff, the donors son, according to the Hindu Law. The facts found are that after the death of the 1st defendants father she and her mother, the 2nd defendant, were under the protection of the plaintiffs father who by survivorship became possessed of the whole of the property which formerly belonged to him and the 1st defendants father. He maintained the 1st defendant and gave her in marriage, and some years afterwards executed the disputed deed of gift, Exhibit I, in 1897. The plaintiff was and still is a minor. The total extent of the family property in the hands of the plaintiffs father and the value of the property comprised in Exihibit I are in dispute. The finding of the lower courts is that the land given under Exhibit I is worth Rs. 400, and that the aggregate of the family property at the time of the gift was worth Rs. 2,400, so that the gift to the 1st defendant was of one-sixth of the property in the hands of the donor. We must accept that finding. The lower courts held that Exhibit I was invalid as against the plaintiff, being of opinion that the gift not having been made at the time of the marriage of the 1st defendant, the plaintiffs father had no right to make it under the Hindu Law.

2. Two contentions have been urged before us at the hearing of this second appeal, preferred by the 1st and 3rd defendants:

(i) That the judgments of the lower courts are not in accordance with the latest exposition of the law by this court regarding gifts made to a daughter of an undivided member of a family ; and

(ii) That the proportion of the family property given to the 1st defendant is not excessive.

3. Mr. T.R. Ramachandra Aiyar, the learned vakil for the 1st respondent, while admitting that the recent decisions of this court have upheld gifts of family property made to a girl born in a Hindu family, contends that there has been no instance where the court has maintained a gift made by any one other than the father, mother and brother of the donee, and contends that such a gift, if made by an uncle, is invalid. He relies on the text of Yajnavalkya, Sloka 118, referred to by Vignaneswara, in dealing with the separate property of a woman : " what was given to a woman by the father, the mother, the husband or a brother is denominated a womans property," and Vignaneswaras own commentary on the sloka [see Chapter I, Section 11, PI. 2 of Colebrooks Translation of the Mitakshara. He also contends that even if a gift to the donors daughter could be valid, the plaintiffs father had no right to give so large a proportion as one-sixth of the total property belonging to himself and his son. Mr. Devadoss, counsel for the appellants, strongly -Relies on a note of Krishnaswami Aiyar J. which that learned Judge had prepared as his judgment in S.A. No. 572 of 1909 before he ceased to be a judge of this court. The judgment in that case, of Munro and Sankaran Nair JJ., is reported in Anivillah Sundararamaya v. Cherla Sitamma (1911) 21 M.L.J. 696, and Krishnaswami Aiyar Js. note is appended to the report of the judgment. Mr. Devadoss contends that, according to the opinion of that learned Judge, any gift by the manager in favour of a girl born in the family would be valid as against the donors son provided it is made so as not to reduce the donors family to want by giving away everything belonging to the family, and that the gift made in this case cannot be regarded as excessive. We do not think that the authority of Krishnaswami Aiyar Js. note will carry the appellants case so far. As a matter of fact the question, what portion of the family property may be validly given away to a girl, did not arise for decision in the case. It was not contended that the proportion was excessive in that case, and the only