The landlord's right to possession is determined by the law at the time of the application, and non-compliance with statutory provisions can entitle the landlord to an order for possession.

Mockett, J.

1. This revision petition is from an order of the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court made on an ejectment petition. The lower Court refused an order for possession. The agreed facts are that on the 7th February, 1944, the petitioner referred to hereafter as the landlord gave notice to one Subbiah his tenant to quit by the 28th February. On the 18th of March, an ejectment suit was filed against Subbiah. It may be here stated that without the knowledge of the landlord, Subbiah had sub-let to one Kotiah and Kotiah had sub-let in June 1943 to the respondent. There was a decree in the ejectment suit No. 143 of 1944 for possession on the 31st of March, 1944, possession to be given on the 14th of April. It was discovered on the 11 th of April that,the respondent was in possession. On the 14th of April, the bailiff went to obtain possession and was obstructed by the respondent. He said he was a sub-tenant under Subbiah whereupon this application of the 21st of April was made to the Small Cause Court. Judgment was reserved on the 4th of July, and it was delivered on the 1st of August.

2. Under the provisions of Section 7-A of the Madras Hbuse Rent Control Order which was in force at the time of the filing of the suit, of the application, for possession and of the obstruction and also at the time of the application to the. Small Cause Court, it was at the option of a tenant in possession if he wished to extend the period of his tenancy by not less than six months and not more than twelve months to give the landlord not less than seven days notice of his intention and by the delivery of such notice, the tenancy should be deemed to be so extended. Action therefore had to emanate from, the tenant. In this case, no notice was given by Subbiah nor by the respondent and proper notice was given by the petitioner to Subbiah. The respondent could have no better rights than Subbiah had, and on that state of facts, the petitioner, the landlord, was entitled to an order for possession. But the learned Judge when he delivered the judgrnent on the 1st August, 1944, based his decision not on what was the state of law at all material times but on what was the law at the time of an amending order dated 11th July, 1944, that is to say, the date of its publication in the Gazette. That order is as follows:

A tenant in possession of a house shall not be evicted therefrom, cvhether in execution of a decree or otherwise, and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this clause.

Section 7-A (2) says:

A landlord wishing to evict a tenant in possession shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. The rest of the sub-section sets out that if the Controller is satisfied that certain conditions are in existence, then an order for ejectment can be made. The outstanding difference between the old Section 7-A and the new Section 7-A is that under the old section the initiative had to come from the tenant if he wished to stay; otherwise he should be given notice. Under the new section, a tenant has complete security of possession so long as he wishes to stay unless the landlord can get an order from the Controller to evict him for good and sufficient cause set out in Sub-section (2). In my view the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to invoke this order which was not then the law. This is an order which takes away the substantive rights of a subject and ought not to be construed to operate retrospectively unless it was so intended to operate. There is no indication of the intention that the order should so be construed or was intended so to operate. The new section makes a very striking change. It has been argued that it only affects the procedure of the Court and therefore may be considered retrospectively. That is not so. It gives far beyond the procedure of the Court. It affects the action out of Court by and the rights of every landlord and tenant in the Presidency. Having h