The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the Hindu Law in relation to the liability of minors in the execution of promissory notes.

Ramesam, J.

1. This Revision Petition arises out of Small Cause Suit No. 1399 of 1929 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif of Guntur in which the plaintiff sought to recover a sum of money due to him evidenced by the promissory note (Ex. A) which itself was in renewal of an earlier promissory note (Ex. A-1). Both these notes were executed by the defendants mother Venkayamma. In the body of the notes the minor defendants are described as the makers with the words "represented by their mother and guardian Venkayamma" but she signed the notes without any such description attached to her name. Ex. A-l itself was in renewal of an earlier promissory note (Ex. A-2) executed by the defendants father on the 28th February, 1922. According to the Hindu Law the sons are liable to pay their fathers debt to the extent of the joint family properties received by them from their father or other assets inherited by them from him. The District Munsif held that on a construction of the suit promissory note it was not intended to make the defendants liable. Referring to Subbanna v. Subbarayudu (1925) 50 M.L.J. 125 the learned District Munsif observed:

that the liability on a promissory note must be determined on the wording of the note and, in each case, the question is whether the instrument has been so drawn in form as to make the executant liable personally or only in his capacity as agent, guardian etc.

2. He then thought that the mother did not intend to make the sons liable because she had used feminine gender in the operative part of the note. This seems to be scarcely relevant as one finds it difficult to conceive in what other form the promissory note can be drawn up. Finally purporting to follow the decisions in Ramaswami Mudaliar v. Muthuswami Aiyar (1915) 30 I.C. 481 (1), Subbanna v. Subbarayudu (1925) 50 M.L.J. 125 and Muthuswami Naicken v. Soma-sundaram Mudaliar (1927)53MLJ814 he dismissed the suit. The plaintiff has filed this Revision Petition.

3. The Revision Petition first came on for hearing before Sundaram Chetti, J. The respondents did not appear. Following the decision in Ramajogayya v. Jagannadhan I.L.R.(1918)Mad. 185 : 36 M.L.J. 29 and Meenakshisundaram Chetti v. Ranga Aiyangar (1931) 139 I.C. 383 the learned Judge set aside the lower Courts decree and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff as sued for. Afterwards the respondents applied to set aside the ex parte decree by showing sufficient cause for their non-appearance. The ex parte decree was accordingly set aside and the petition came up for disposal before our brother Varadachariar, J. The learned Judge referred the matter to a Bench of two Judges who referred it to a Full Bench.

4. In Subbanna v. Subbarayudu (1925) 50 M.L.J. 125 the question in a similar case was whether the guardians were personally liable. It was held that they were not as it was clear on the note that they intended to exclude personal liability. Whether the minor was liable or not did not arise in that case. But as it must have been intended to bind somebody and as it was held that the guardians were not liable, probably it would have been held that the minor was liable if the question had arisen. A portion of the case related to executors and the conclusion was different. This case does not therefore support the District Munsifs conclusion.

5. The decision in Muthusami Naicken v. Somasundaram Mudaliar (1927)53MLJ814 is a decision of a single Judge.

6. The case in Ramaswami Mudaliar v. Muthuswami Aiyar (1915) 30 I.C. 481 was decided in 1915 and is similar to the case in Muthusami Naicken v. Somasundaram Mudaliar (1927)53MLJ814 . So far as the form of the promissory note and the intention of the maker are concerned, the case before us is similar to Subbanna v. Subbarayudu (1925) 50 M.L.J. 125. The intention of the maker of the note was to exclude the personal liability of the guardian but to make the wards liable.

7. One must look at all the surrounding circumstances in inferring the