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1934 Supreme(Mad) 24

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Jackson, J.
Venkatakrishna Reddi
Versus
Batcha Reddi
Decided On : 26.01.1934

The main legal point established in the judgment is the finality of the decision regarding the sufficiency of the stamp on a document, as influenced by legal provisions and case law.

Headnote:

promissory note - contract dispute - Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, Order 39, Rule 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (England), 1883, Blewitt v. Tritton (1892) 2 Q.B. 327, Siordet v. Kucsynski (1855) 17 C.B. 251, Devachand v. Hirachand Kamaraj I.L.R.(1889)13 Bom. 449, Nirode Basini Mitra v. Sital Chandra Ghatak (1930) 51 C.L.J. 569 - The court discussed the admissibility of a document as a promissory note and the finality of the decision regarding the sufficiency of the stamp, citing various legal provisions and case law.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff sued defendant for Rs. 300, alleging it was advanced with an agreement for repayment at 12% interest. The District Munsif admitted the document as an acknowledgment and decreed the suit. The District Judge dismissed the suit, disbelieving the prior agreement and treating it as an ordinary promissory note transaction.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the lower court's dismissal of the suit was based on the disbelief of the prior contract, not merely on the improper admission of the promissory note. The appellate court's treatment of the document as a promissory note was discussed in light of various legal provisions and case law.

Issues: The issues revolved around the nature of the transaction, the admissibility of the document as a promissory note, and the finality of the decision regarding the sufficiency of the stamp.

Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was influenced by the interpretation of legal provisions such as the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, and case law including Blewitt v. Tritton and Siordet v. Kucsynski, emphasizing the finality of the decision regarding the sufficiency of the stamp.

Final Decision: The Civil Revision Petition was dismissed with costs.

JUDGMENT

Jackson, J.

1. Plaintiff sues defendant for Rs. 300 on the allegation that he advanced this amount to defendant who agreed to repay it at 12 per cent. interest. "In support of this" he executed a document understamped for a promissory note. The District Munsif admitted the document as an acknowledgment, found the agreement to be proved and decreed the suit.

2. The District Judge disbelieved the story of the prior agreement and held it to be an ordinary promissory note transaction. Accordingly he dismissed the suit.

3. In revision it is pleaded that he was not entitled to reverse the decree on the mere ground of an improper admission of the promissory note.

4. The Lower Court dismissed the suit because it did not believe the evidence of the prior contract, not on the mere ground that the document was improperly admitted; and if the Deputy Registrar had read the papers he would never have admitted this Civil Revision Petition.

5. Now two points are taken. Firstly, that the cause of action was merely the defendants possession of plaintiffs money under a contract which had become void, and the money was recoverable under Section 65 of the Contract Act. That is not the case which plaintiff brought to Court; for he pleaded a definite agreement, and only failed because the Judge thought his evidence false.

6. Secondly, that having found it to be a promissory note transaction the Judge should have decreed it as such. Again this fails on the short ground that it is not plaintiffs original plea. A party cannot plead an antecedent debt and acknowledgment, and then complain of gross irregularity because he is not given a decree upon a promissory note.

7. The argument in this Court has ranged over the question whether when the trial Court admits an understamped promissory note merely as an acknowledgment, the appellate Court can treat it as a promissory note. In the light of what has been stated above this question is merely academic, but it requires an answer because the cases cited are not consistent. The correct view of the law is undoubtedly that once a document has been admitted, the question of its admissibility on fiscal grounds is finally set at rest. The appellate Court may apply its mind to the nature of the document unfettered by any extraneous consideration. But in Gopala Padayachi v. Rajagopal Naidu AIR1926Mad1148 it has been ruled by a single Judge that the appellate Court is not bound under Section 36 of the Stamp Act to admit the document any further or for any other purposes than the Lower Court has admitted it. Of course it was never suggested that the statute bound the Court to go further; what is meant is that under the statute if the Lower Court has admitted a document, say as an acknowledgment, the appellate Court is free to refuse to consider whether it is a promissory note. It may take the view of the Lower Court as final not only as regards the admissibility but as regards the character of the document. As observed just above this passage " I am not at present prepared to go further and admit the respondents contention that once it has been admitted it can be used for any purpose." Then as the learned Judge points out the Full Bench decision in Devachand v. Hirachand Kamaraj I.L.R.(1889)13 Bom. 449 is against him, but he satisfies himself that he can distinguish that case. It is, however, indistinguishable. In the Bombay case the Lower Court admitted a khata as a bond, and the appellate Court was asked to treat it as a promissory note. In the Madras case the document was admitted as an acknowledgment and the appellate Court was asked to treat it as a promissory note. Bombay agreed, Madras refused; and both cannot be right. It is not easy to discover the principle upon which the Madras ruling is founded. Starting with the general presumption that an appellate Court has an unfettered mind, how can it be said that when the Judge picks a certain document out of the record which he holds to be a promissory note, he is








































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