The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of res judicata under Section 11, Explanation (4) and Order 2, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, emphasizing the need to raise objections to jurisdiction at the earliest possible opportunity.

Venkatasubba Rao, J.

1. The question raised in this appeal is whether the present suit is barred by res judicata by reason of the decree in O.S. No. 846 of 1923. The bar that is pleaded is not confined to any particular matter in issue but extends to the entire claim. The suit has been brought by one Rayarappan Nambiyar, who fills the dual position of (1) the karnavan of Karakath Idam and (2) the Uralan of Kadamberi Devaswom where the presiding deity is Bhagavathi; in other words, the plaintiffs right to hold the trusteeship of the temple arises from his being the manager of his tarwad. Several reliefs are claimed in the plaint over, what is alleged to be a subsidiary shrine known as Muttapan Devasthanam, under the control of one Valia Ramunni, the karnavan of a Thiya tarwad, and as such, the "Matayan" or the head of the shrine in question. 1 he plaintiff s case shortly is that the defendant shrine is a subsidiary temple owing allegiance to its suzerain - the Kadamberi Devaswom - and bound to render it homage inter alia by making certain recurring payments. There are some other reliefs which are claimed, to which it will become necessary to refer presently. The question is, whether either of the two grounds taken by the learned Advocate-General is well founded, namely, first that the parties to the present and the previous suit are different and secondly, that the previous suit was tried by a Court which had no jurisdiction to try it. As to the former contention, it is urged that in the present action the right put forward is that of the deity, whereas in the previous suit, the karnavan was asserting his private or individual right. The argument, however, proceeds upon a thorough misreading of the two plaints. There has been a disingenuous attempt in the plaint to make it appear that the present claim differs from the old one which however has not succeeded. In spite of the wilful confusion, that has been introduced, the two claims are not only substantially but identically the same. On the previous occasion, the trustee was described as the plaintiff, suing on behalf of the institution; in the present complaint, the institution figures as the plaintiff suing through its trustee. This is a distinction without a difference; even otherwise, almost every paragraph of the previous plaint shows, that the right put forward by Rayarappan Nambiar (the same person as the present plaintiff) was then, as now, on behalf of the devaswom and not in his capacity as the karnavan of his tarwad. The matter is so patent and so manifest that it would be a waste of time to refer in any detail to the relevant passages. Not only were these two very shrines the plaintiff and the defendant in the previous suit, but they happened to be represented by the same individuals as at present. I fail to see what principle can be deduced from either of the two cases cited by the learned Advocate-General, which can possibly be applied to the facts here. In the first case Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick (1925) 49 M.L.J. 30 : L.R. 52 IndAp 245 : I.L.R. 52 Cal. 809 (P.C.) all that was held was, that a Hindu idol is a "juristic entity" and has a juridical status with the power of suing and being sued. The conception of a family idol as a movable chattel, capable of being treated as property, is not warranted by the authorities and is opposed to principle: that is, the gist of the decision. There was a dispute in regard to a right claimed by one of the parties, to remove the idol from the allotted place of worship, and the only matter decided was, that there was a broader question, which the action raised, than the mere establishment of individual rights, namely, that relating to the interests of the deity. It was therefore held that a disinterested third party, other than either of the contesting claimants, should act as the next friend of, and appear for, the idol. It is difficult to discover any principle laid down here applicable to the fa