The central legal point established in the judgment is the significance of possession transfer in determining the commencement of the limitation period under Article 134 of the Limitation Act.

Abdur Rahman, J.

1. This is an appeal dismissing the plaintiffs suit for redemption and possession of 41 cents of land bearing Survey No. 382-B as being barred under Article 134 of the Limitation Act. The defendants who are apparently quite rich, have not chosen to appear. The facts of the case are quite simple.

2. The property in suit originally belonged to one Kuppa Goundan, who mortgaged it on 19th September, 1890, with one Lakshminarayana. The mortgage was usufructuary and it was provided in the deed (Ex. K) that the mortgagor would pay the principal amount and redeem the property on 11th April, 1901. Kuppa Goundan sold the property to the plaintiffs uncle in 1896 under Ex. A and directed the vendee to pay the mortgage money due under Ex. K to the mortgagee. The property subsequently fell to the plaintiff under Ex. B.

3. Prior to the date on which the mortgage could be redeemed, Lakshminarayana died - apparently leaving large debts due to the father of defendants 1 to 4 and his widow therefore acting as a guardian on behalf of his minor son executed a simple mortgage (Ex. IV) for Rs. 35,000, on 17th October, 1899. The property which had been mortgaged with Lakshminarayana under Ex. K and subsequently sold to the plaintiff, was also included in the deed. The mortgage was without possession. She executed another mortgage in favour of the same mortgagee for Rs. 1,19,771-8-0 on 4th November, 1900 (Ex. V). This purported to be a usufructuary mortgage for a period of ten years; but the recital in this deed points out to the fact that she was not in a position to surrender actual possession of the properties, as they happened to be in the possession of a receiver appointed in connection with O.S. No. 5 of 1900 and pending before the District Court of Cuddalore. A provision was therefore made that as long as she was not in a position to deliver possession, interest would be paid at Rs. 0-14-0 per cent, per annum.

4. The question, therefore, arises whether in the circumstances of the case Article 134 would apply. If so, from what date did the period of limitation actually begin to run?

5. It may be stated at the outset that since the property in suit was mortgaged in 1899 under a simple mortgage and in 1900 under a usufructuary mortgage for a period often years, the suit would be barred by limitation, if Article 134 is held to apply - long before it was filed in 1928 and the present words now substituted in the 3rd column of Article 134 by Act I of 1929, would have no application to the facts of this case. It is hardly necessary to trace the history of how the words in the 3rd column of Article 134 were changed by various legislations from time to time. Suffice it to say that before the Amendment of 1929, the words appearing in the third column of Article 134 were "the date of transfer" and it is these words which I have been called upon to consider and construe.

6. There is no doubt that since Article 134 contains a stringent provision of law, the onus of proving facts which would attract the provisions of this article in preference to Article 148 or even possibly Article 144 would lie heavily on the party who wishes to claim the benefit of an abridged period of limitation. The remarks made in Radanath Doss v. Gisborne & Co. (1871) 14 M.I.A. 1 and Juggernath v. Syud Shah Mahomed amply support the proposition mentioned above.

7. It is true that there is no mention of any alienation in favour of the plaintiffs uncle in the mortgage deeds effected by Lakshminarayanas widow on behalf of her son - but before the provisions of Article 134 can be attracted, it must be shown that the mortgagee, that is, the father of defendants 1 to 4 had no knowledge of any alienation by the original mortgagor, that is, Kuppa Goundan of his rights. It might not have been actually necessary to prove good faith but the absence of such a knowledge must at least have been established. There is no evidence in this case from which such an inference may be dra