The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the nature of the relationship between the parties after partition, the applicability of the Limitation Act, and the determination of the representative capacity in relation to a common debt and subsequent property purchase.

Varadachariar, J.

1. This appeal arises out of a suit for partition. The first plaintiff and the other defendants are their sons and grandsons. Till 1915, the two branches constituted an undivided Hindu family which was possessed of extensive properties, movable and immovable. They had also a family business. In 1915 partition between the two branches began and the parties have gone on dividing portions of the properties, from time to time, sometimes by arrangement between themselves and sometimes through arbitrators. Some movables, some immovables and various outstandings remained undivided even at the date of the plaint in this suit which was filed in 1931. After the division began in 1915, the family trade continued to be carried on till 1922, though it appears that from 1920 the defendants began to do business on their own account as well. After 1922 it is admitted that no further business was carried on in common. On the other hand, the plaintiffs branch also began to do business on its own account from 1922. Between 1922 and the date of the institution of this suit, the outstandings due to the family were being collected by the first plaintiff or the first defendant according to convenience; such collections have sometimes been divided between them as and when they were made but on other occasions the parties seemed to have retained in their own hands the amounts respectively collected by them. This suit was accordingly instituted by the plaintiffs branch for a partition of the immovable properties still remaining undivided, for a division of the outstandings remaining uncollected and for the appointment of a commissioner to take accounts of the collections respectively made by the two branches with a view to direct one party or the other to pay the others share of excess collected by such party. The plaint refers to the properties still remaining undivided as "coparcenary" property. This is not an accurate description; and the arguments both in the Court below and before us have proceeded on the footing that in 1915 the parties must be regarded as having become divided in status; but according to the plaintiffs case, there can be no doubt that the suit properties are properties belonging in common to a family which had become divided in status.

2. As regards some of the immovable properties of which partition was claimed, there was little or no dispute. As regards items 31 to 83 of the plaint schedule, the defendants contended that the properties themselves must be held to belong exclusively to the defendants branch, the plaintiffs being at best only entitled to a share of the amount due under the decree in O.S. No. 57 of 1918 in execution of which these properties were purchased by the first defendant. In answer to prayer for the division of outstandings and for the appointment of a commissioner to take an account of the collections made by each party, the defendants raised a plea of limitation, contending that after 1915 the first plaintiff and the first defendant must be deemed to have carried on the business only as partners, that the partnership was dissolved in 1922 and that any claim for the taking of the accounts thereof must therefore be deemed to be governed by Article 106 of the Limitation Act. A further defence to the claim for the taking of accounts was raised with reference to the order passed in E.P. No. 26 of 1927 in O.S. No. 27 of 1925 on the file of the Sub-Court. A prayer made by the present defendant as decree-holders in that suit for the taking of accounts had been disallowed by the executing Court. Hence it was said that the matter must be taken to have been concluded by that order. These three pleas were overruled by the lower Court and a preliminary decree for partition and for the taking of the necessary accounts was passed; hence this appeal by the defendants.

3. It may be convenient to deal at the outset with the question of limitation, because in one view that plea will also bear upon th