Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.

1. The question which we are called upon now to decide in this case is whether the memorandum of appeal has been properly stamped. The suit out of which the appeal arises was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga for the taking of the accounts of a dissolved partnership. The plaintiff valued his relief at Rs. 16,500 and paid the court-fee of Rs. 1,004-15-0. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by law of limitation. The plaintiff then appealed to this Court and in his memorandum of appeal valued the relief at Rs. 1,000 paying the corresponding court-fee of Rs. 112-7-0. In consequence of the decision of this Court in Nukala Venkatanandam, In re (1932) 64 M.L.J. 122 : I.L.R. 56 Mad. 705, this valuation was accepted by the officer whose duty it was to check the stamping of the memorandum of appeal. But that case has recently been overruled by a Full Bench in Dhanukodi Nayakkar, In re AIR1938Mad435 . The respondents have in consequence contended that the appellant should value his relief in accordance with the figure at which it was valued in his plaint. The appellant contends that, notwithstanding the fact that Nukala Venkatanandam, In re (1932) 64 M.L.J. 122 : I.L.R. 56 Mad. 705, has been overruled, the case is governed by Faizullah Khan v. Mauladad Khan (1929) 57 M.L.J. 281 : L.R. 56 IndAp 232 : I.L.R. 10 Lah. 737 (P.C.) and that the memorandum of appeal is properly stamped.

2. The question resolves itself into this: - Can the appellant in an appeal against a decree dismissing a suit for an account change his valuation, although the subject-matter of the appeal is the same as in the trial Court?. Section 7(4) of the Court-Fees Act requires a suit for accounts to be stamped "according to the value at which the relief is valued in the plaint or memorandum" and adds:

In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought.

3. It is said, that, as there is a reference in this clause to the memorandum of appeal, the appellant is allowed to value the relief on appeal at whatever he likes, notwithstanding that he valued it in the trial Court at a higher figure and that the correctness of this course is expressly recognised in Faisullah Khan v. Manladad Khan (1929) 57 M.L.J. 281 : L.R. 56 IndAp 232 : I.L.R. 10 Lah. 737 (P.C.).

4. It was held by a Full Bench of this Court in Ramiah v. Ramaswami (1913)24MLJ233 and by another Full Bench in Arunachalam Chetty v. Rangaswami Pillai (1914) 28 M.L.J. 118 : I.L.R. 38 Mad. 922 that a plaintiff in a suit of this nature is entitled to value his relief at what he likes, it being no objection to his valuation that it is an arbitrary one; and these decisions have not been challenged before us. We, therefore, start with this. The plaintiff may in his plaint value the relief at his own figure. But having made the valuation for the purpose of the litigation, can he reduce it when he comes to appeal? It has always been considered in this Court and in the other High Courts in India that he cannot. Until Nukala Venkatanandam, In re (1932) 64 M.L.J. 122 : I.L.R. 56 Mad. 705, was decided, a plaintiff appealing against a decree dismissing a suit for an account was required in this Court to stamp his memorandum of appeal according to the full amount of the valuation on his plaint. Of course he could if he so desired waive some of the relief which he claimed in the trial Court and in this case he would stamp his memorandum of appeal accordingly.

5. The Court will not change a long-established practice unless it is shown that the practice is opposed to law. Before we can hold that the practice which has been followed in this Court until the decision in Nukala Venkatanandam, In re (1932) 64 M.L.J. 122 : I.L.R. 56 Mad. 705 and throughout in other Courts should be altered, it must be shown that the practice is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 7 (4)(f) of the Court-Fees Act. It must be re