The court established that the High Court could revise a decision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure if the subordinate court's decision was illegal or with material irregularity.

Abdur Rahman, J.

1. This is a petition for revision against the order passed by Mr. Mack, District Judge of East Godavari at Rajahmundry, declaring the petitioner to be a tout under Section 36 of the Legal Practitioners Act.

2. A preliminary objection has been raised by the Government Pleader to the effect that the order passed by the lower Court is not open to revision. The point is of considerable importance as it involves the question of valuable rights of a citizen and has therefore to be carefully examined.

3. The contention raised by the Government Pleader is based on the addition of Sub-clause. (2) to Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which did not find a place in the corresponding Section 107 of the prior Act of 1919. Sub-clause. (2) of Section 224 of the present Act reads as follows :

Nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to a High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior Court which is not otherwise subject to appeal or revision.

4. Basing his reliance on the amendment, the Government Pleader contends that the High Courts in India could revise orders, similar to the one in question now, either under Section 15 of the High Courts Act or later under Section 107 of the Government of India Act (1919) before the new Act came into force,but this power has been taken away by the above-stated amendment. He further urges that the provisions contained in Section 115 and Section 439 of the Code of Civil and Criminal Procedure respectively have no application and the High Court is thus not entitled to revise the order although it is admitted by him that in a suitable case, a petition by way of a writ of certiorari might be competent.

5. The amendment contained in the new Government of india Act makes it clear that the High Court would not be entitled to revise the order in question under Section 224 of the Act, if it is not capable of being revised under any other provision of law. I am also in agreement with the contention that Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would have no application to the present case. A bare perusal of the section would show that it is inapplicable. The only question then is whether Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not authorise the High Court to revise the order.

6. The learned Government Pleader has placed reliance in support of his contention on a number of decisions and on going through them I find that the rulings given in In the matter of the petition of Kedar Nath I.L.R. (1908) All. 59, In the matter of the petition of Kashi Nath and others I.L.R. (1923) All 676 and Maganbhai v. Dinkarrao I.L.R. (1932) 56 Bom. 577 have either merely followed In the matter of the Petition of Madho Ram I.L.R. (18999) All 181 or held that an order passed under Section 36 of the Legal Practitioners Act was capable of being revised under Section 15 of the High Courts Act or Section 107 of the Government of India Act (1919). The last proposition is undoubtedly sound but, as already held by me, has been rendered useless for this purpose by the addition of the amendment to the present Government of India Act. As for In the matter of the petition of Madho Ram I.L.R. (1899) All 181 one would have to examine the pronouncement with respect and care that it deserves as it comes from an eminent Chief Justice like Strachey, C.J., before one respectfully agrees with his conclusion or begs to differ from it with deference. On an examination of this decision I find that although it has been stated in general terms that the provisions of Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (1882) do not apply the learned Chief Justice has given no reason for this opinion. This was probably considered to be unnecessary as it was found that the High Courts had very wide powers of superintendence under Section 15 of the High Courts Act, and could in a suitable case interfere with an order passed by a Subordinate Court. Moreover the ground token in that decision was