The plaintiff's right to withdraw a suit is not absolute and is subject to limitations. The withdrawal of the suit does not automatically terminate the court's jurisdiction, and pending applications and objections can still be considered. Additionally, a third party can maintain an application to enforce a compromise, even after the plaintiff's withdrawal, as long as the compromise is lawful.

Sundaram Chetty, J.

1. This civil revision petition is filed by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 56 of 1930 on the file of the sub-Court, Devacottah, against the order passed on her petition (I.A. No. 249 of 1933) under Section 151 and Order 23, Rule 1, Civil P.C., in which she reported to the Court her withdrawal from the suit as she had no longer any interest in the estate of her husband, by reason of her having adopted a son to him, and asked the Court to strike the suit off the file. That petition was dismissed by the lower? Court. The correctness of that order is challenged in this revision petition. The question arising for decision in this case is of some importance and has been elaborately argued on both sides. The aforesaid suit was filed by the plaintiff, who is the widow of the late Muthu Veerappa Chettiar, against two brothers of her deceased husband, viz. defendants 1 and 3, defendant 2 being the son of defendant 1, for a decree directing the defendants to render an account of the assets belonging to her estate which had been in their enjoyment from 28th January 1924 and for the recovery of all the documents, securities, account books and other papers relating to the estate, and for the execution of such documents as would be necessary to enable the plaintiff to realize the outstandings and also for the recovery of the profits that have been derived from out of the plaintiffs funds and the delivery to her of all jewels, silver ware and other valuable articles appertaining to her estate in the possession of the defendants. Written statements were filed by the defendants and issues were also settled. One of the pleas was that the plaintiff disclaimed and renounced her interest in her husbands estate by virtue of the arrangement embodied in an award of 1928. This forms the subject of the first issue framed in the suit. The plaintiffs right to recover possession of her husbands estate from the defendants and to call on them to render accounts is the subject-matter of the third issue.

2. During the course of the suit a compromise is said to have been entered into by way of a family arrangement, settling all the matters in controversy between the parties to the suit and one Meyappa Chetti, the son of a deceased brother of the plaintiffs husband. The said Meyappa Chetti intervened in the suit with I.A. No. 673 of 1931 in which he sought to be added as a party to the suit, in order to enforce the rajinama alleged to have been entered into as stated above. This rajinama purporting to contain the terms of the settlement and to bear the marks and thumb impressions of the plaintiff and also the signatures of defendants 1 and 3 and the said Meyappa Chetti, was put into Court along with I.A. No. 673 of 1931, and as it contained a prayer that a decree should be passed according to the terms thereof, it was numbered as I.A. No. 674 of 1931. Meyappa Chetti who filed both these petitions in the lower Court is the present respondent 1, and he will be referred to as such in this judgment. Both these petitions were opposed by the plaintiff as well as defendants 1 and 3.

3. According to the case set up by respondent 1, this rajinama was entered into as a family arrangement by which all the matters in controversy between the parties to the suit and himself were settled and that it was also agreed as ori6 of the terms of the compromise that he should be made defendant 4 in the suit BO that he may be bound by and participate in the family arrangement and compromise. The plaintiff contended that she was not really a consenting party to the compromise, but was made to execute it under circumstances amounting to misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence. She further pleaded that the compromise was not a lawful one, as it contained terms opposed to public policy, whereas defendants 1 and 3 alleged that it was not a completed arrangement and was intended to take effect if some other matters in dispute-between the parties were also settled by