The legal ownership vested in a person by fulfilling the representative character determines their eligibility to sue as a pauper.

Venkataramana Rao, J.

1. This case was admitted by Burn, J., on the ground that the question involved in the case is of some general importance. On the exact matter in question, there seems to be some difference of opinion. A Bench of the Rangoon High Court in Mitra v. Corporation of Royal Exchange Assurance A.I.R. 1930 Rang. 259 has taken the view that an Official Receiver cannot be allowed to sue as a pauper where he himself is possessed of sufficient funds to carry on the suit. A different view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in Mohammad Zaki v. The Municipal Board of Mainpuri (1918) 16 A.L.J. 440. The nearest analogy in my opinion seems to be the case of an executor in regard to which the preponderance of opinion in this Court has been that he can be permitted to sue as a pauper if the estate which he represents, does not possess sufficient funds to carry on the suit - vide Sivagami Ammal v. Gopalaswami Odayar (1924) 48 M.L.J. 390 and Ammakannammal v. Damodara. A different view has been taken by Jackson, J., in A.S. Radhakrishna Aiyar In re (1924) 88 I.C. 91 : 6 P.L.T. 380 where I find the one side was not represented. I therefore think it desirable that this matter should be decided by a Bench. I accordingly refer this Civil Revision Petition to a Bench for disposal.

2. The case then came on for hearing before the Full Bench as constituted above.

JUDGMENT

Venkataramana Rao, J.

3. The question raised in this Civil Revision Petition is whether an Official Receiver, in whom the estate of an insolvent vested under Section 28, Clause 2 of the Provincial Insolvency Act by virtue of an order of adjudication made by the Court, can institute a suit as a pauper for the recovery of the said estate. The decision turns upon the construction of Order 33, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, which runs thus:

Subject to the following provisions, any suit may be instituted by a pauper.

Explanation. - A person is a pauper when he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit, or, where no such fee is prescribed, when he is not entitled to property worth one hundred rupees other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject-matter of the suit.

4. The point now in controversy is where an Official Receiver is a "person" within the meaning of the above explanation. There is no definition of person in the Civil Procedure Code. Prima facie, the interpretation of the said term in the General Clauses Act would apply, according to which a "person" shall include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. This connotes that person would include both natural and legal persons. This is in strict accordance with the conception of a person in law. In his book of Jurisprudence (8th Edition) at page 329, Salmond observes thus:

So far as legal theory is concerned, a person is any being whom the law regards as capable of rights or duties. Any being that is so capable is a person, whether a human being or not, and no being that is not so capable is a person, even though he be a man. Persons are the substances of which rights and duties are the attributes. It is only in this respect that persons possess juridical significance, and this is the exclusive point of view from which personality receives legal recognition. Persons as so defined are of two kinds, distinguishable as natural and legal.

5. He further points out that a natural person is capable of a double personality. At page 335, he explains it thus:

It often happens that a single human being possesses a double personality. He is one man, but two persons. Unus humo, it is said, plures personas sustinet. In one capacity, or in one right, as English lawyers says he may have legal relations with himself in his other capacity or right... This double personality exists chiefly in the case of trusteeship. A trustee is, a person in whom the property of another is nominally, i.e., technically vested, to the