The main legal point established in the judgment is the processual nature of the right affected by Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act and the strict interpretation of the registration requirement for maintaining a suit.

Stodart, J.

1. The appeal is by the plaintiff. The plaintiff is a firm and the suit was against a debtor of the firm to recover money due on dealings. The suit was filed on 12th October, 1933, that is, it was presented into Court on that day and it was admitted to the file on 20th November, 1933. The Partnership Act IX of 1932 came into force on 1st October, 1932, except Section 69 which came into force according to Section 1(3) of the Act on 1st October, 1933. And the question for decision in this suit is whether, having regard to the provisions of Section 69 the suit is maintainable. Section 69(2) is:

No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered, and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of firms as partners in the firm.

2. This suit was instituted after 1st October, 1933, and the trial Court and the Court of first appeal have both held that it is not maintainable, because the plaintiff firm was not registered on 12th October, 1933.

3. Another point that arises in the suit is this. The plaintiff did actually get itself registered on 15th January, 1934; and it is contended that the lower Courts were wrong in not holding that the suit could be treated as valid as from that date.

4. Two arguments have been put forward on appeal. The first is that the right to bring a suit without being registered as a firm to recover this debt was a right which had vested before the passing of Act IX of 1932, and so is not affected by the provisions of that Act. That is the argument founded on general principle, and it is also contended that Section 74 of the Act confirms this principle.

5. The second argument relates to the further point which I have just mentioned, namely, that the lower Courts should have treated the suit as valid as from the date when the firm became registered.

6. The relevant words of Section 74 are as follows:

Nothing in this Act shall affect or be deemed to affect-Co) any right, title, interest, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred before the commencement of this Act, or

(a) any legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right.

7. Before examining the principal argument in the appeal which is briefly that Section 74 merely enunciates the general principle that new enactments cannot retrospectively affect vested rights unless by express provision in the enactments themselves, I would observe that the legal proceedings indicated in Section 74(&) have been interpreted in some decisions to mean proceedings pending at the commencement of the Act, and it is argued as a preliminary point that that interpretation is not correct. With all respect to the learned Judges who decided those cases, namely, Surendranath De v. Manohar De I.L.R.(1934) 62 Cal. 312 and Firm Krishen Lal v. Abdul Ghafur A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 893 I must say that I find myself in agreement with the learned Government pleader who appears for the appellants on this point. There appears to be no reason why, if the legislature intended to confine the operation of Section 74 only to suits and proceedings which were pending at the time of the commencement of the Act, they should not have said so in express terms. One finds such provisions in other enactments. On the main point, however, namely, that Section 69 either by the general law or by reason of the operation of Section 74 has no retrospective effect, I find myself unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the appellant. The argument, as I have said is that the firm, prior to the passing of the Act had the right to sue for debt without being registered, that right was a vested right which cannot be taken away by the Act, and therefore since the cause of action accrued before the Act the plaintiff firm can bring exactly the same kind of suit as it could before the Act, that is, without first getting itself registered under Ch. VII of the Act. In my