The plaintiff must prove affirmatively that there was no reasonable and probable cause for the complaint, considering the credibility of the informant and whether a reasonable person would have acted on the information.

Venkataramana Rao, J.

1. This second appeal arises from a suit for damages for malicious pro. sedition. The case for the plaintiff is that defendant 1 owned certain lands attached to Novelock Bhagayet near Thengal village, that defendant 1 authorized defendant 2 to institute a criminal complaint and defendant 2 filed the complaint, 0. C. No. 548 of 1926, on the file of the Wallajah Sub-Magistrates Court against the plaintiff and others charging them with offences under Sections 147 and 430, I.P.C, alleging that on or about 11th November 1926 forty people, including the plaintiff (who was at that time supposed to be acting on behalf of Kalyani Ammal), ryots of Thengal village, gathered together and prevented the men of defendant 1 from taking water in the Thengal Kasam which they are entitled to do, by removing or attempting to remove a dam which was put up by the men of defendant 1, that that complaint was thrown out as false, that defendant 1 was the real prosecutor in the case, and defendant 2 filed the complaint only on behalf of defendant 1, that the complaint was a malicious one and that therefore the plaintiff is entitled to damages for malicious prosecution. The main defence on behalf of defendant 1 is that he was entitled to take water from the Thengal Kasam, that he acted on the information given by defendant 2 as his agent which he had no reason to disbelieve, that there was in fact an unlawful obstruction by the plaintiff and other ryots, and therefore he had reasonable and probable cause in instituting the complaint, that he was therefore not actuated by malice, and that there is no cause of action against him. The case for defendant 2 is that the plaintiffs men-did really cause obstruction which was unlawful. The learned District Munsif of Ranipet dismissed the plaintiffs suit on the ground that there was reasonable and probable cause in instituting the complaint, that there was an unlawful obstruction by the plaintiff and other ryots, and that, in any event, defendant 1, acted on the information of defendant 2 whom he believed. The learned Subordinate Judge-reversed this decision on the ground that defendant 1 was not entitled to take Thengal Kasam water for his lands in Novelock Bhagayet, He further found that many of the statements made by defendant 2 in his deposition regarding the plaintiff were false, and that his object in instigating defendant 1 to file the criminal complaint was to satisfy his spite towards the plaintiff, that in any event defendant 1 cannot take shelter under the action of defendant 2, that he should have-made proper enquiries before instituting, the complaint, and therefore he must be held to have had no reasonable or probable cause in launching the prosecution. Having heard the learned counsel on both sides, I am not inclined to disturb the finding against defendant 2; but it seems to me that the decision so far as defendant 1 is concerned cannot be sustained. The facts in this case which have been found to be undisputed are these: that forty people of Thengal village including the plaintiff assembled on 11th November 1926, and that obstruction was caused to the taking of water by those people, and the water was being taken to Novelock Bhagayet for a long time before the attempted obstruction. I may also observe that after the criminal complaint defendant 1 did institute a civil suit to have his right established in consequence of the objection raised by the villagers of Thengal village, and that in that civil suit there has been a final adjudication that defendant 1 is entitled to take water from the Thengal Kasam for his lands in Novelock village.

2. Mr. Thiagaraja Iyer has asked me to admit the judgment in the civil suit in evidence because the question of title has been raised by the plaintiff and the learned Subordinate Judge found that defendant 1 had no right to take water and therefore he could not have had any reasonable belief in his own right and therefore there can be