The main legal point established in the judgment is the High Court's jurisdiction to deal with contempt of an inferior court, both under Common Law jurisdiction and statutory jurisdiction under Section 15 of the High Courts Act.

Charles Arnold White. Kt., C.J.

1. In this case a notice was sent to Mr. Venkat Rao, Pleader, calling upon him to show cause why he should not he dealt with by this Court for contempt of court in sending to the District Munsif of Bellary, during the pendency of an inquiry by him into a charge against Mr. Venkat Rao of disobedience to an injunction order, a certain letter charging the Munsif with malicious and improper conduct in connection with the inquiry and giving notice to him of a suit for damages on that account. The proceedings raise the very important question whether this Court has jurisdiction to deal with contempt of an inferior court. The case, as I have said, is of great importance and it is one of first impression, but as we have made up our minds with regard to it we do not think any useful purpose will be served by further consideration. Now Dr. Swaminathan, who appeared for the Pleader, not only refrained from raising the question of jurisdiction on behalf of his client, but he expressly declined to argue it as counsel for Mr. Venkata Rao. He expressed his readiness, however, to show cause against the rule, on the ground of want of jurisdiction as amicus curiae. We have accordingly had the benefit of his argument as well as that of the Advocate-General. It seems to me that there are two questions for us to consider : First, have we inherent Common Law jurisdiction in the matter? And, secondly, have we statutory jurisdiction under the powers conferred on this Court by Section 15 of the High Courts Act? I take the first point. There can, I think, be no question that as regards contempts of court committed before this Court we have the jurisdiction of the old Court of Kings Bench. In Surendranath Banerjees case I.L.R. (1883) C. 109 the law is thus enunciated by Sir Barnes Peacock. He says, p. 131 :

"Such an offence - that is, libel published out of court when the court, was not sitting - is something more than mere defamation and is of a different character. It is an offence which by the Common Law of England is punishable by the High Court in a summary manner with fine, or imprisonment, or both. That part of the Common Law of England was introduced in the Presidency towns when the late Supreme Courts were respectively established by the Charters of Justice. The High Courts in the Presidencies are Superior Courts of Records and the offence of contempt and the powers of the High Court for punishing it are the same there (that is in India) as in this country (that is in England), not by virtue of the Penal Code for British India and the Code of Criminal Procedure, but by virtue of the Common Law of England."

2. The next question is what is the Common Law of England with regard to the power of the Kings Bench Division of the High Court in England, with reference to contempts committed before an inferior court? Curiously enough, this question does not seem to have been considered fully until a comparatively recent date. But we have two recent cases, one decided in 1903 and the other in 1906, in which there are two very interesting and instructive judgments delivered by Mr. Justice Wills on behalf of the Division Court. In King v. Parke (1903) I.K.B. 432 a person was charged at Petty Sessions with an indictable offence triable only at Assizes. Matter was published in a newspaper tending to interfere with a fair trial. It was held that the High Court had jurisdiction to deal with the publisher for contempt of court, notwithstanding that at the time of the publication the person charged had not yet been committed for trial. In that case the question which we have to consider today did not arise, although there are some observations of the learned Judge with reference to it. On page 436 the Judges observe :

"It may be conceded that the jurisdiction to commit for contempt of court is confined to contempt of the court exercising the jurisdiction. Upon the wider and more general question whether this Court will treat in