The legal presumption of minority, exclusive powers of certificated guardians, inability to ratify a void transaction, and the responsibility of the money-lender to ensure the minor's estate is legally liable for the debt.

1. The plaintiff in the lower court, a money-leader by profession, based his claim upon two hypothecation bonds, Exhibit Z, for Rs. 1,000 executed on July 27th, 1898 and Ex. A for Rs. 3,000 executed on June 28th, 1899, and as his suit was dismissed he now appeals, On account of the first defendants minority, a guardian named Krishnasawmy Iyer was appointed on January 18th, 1897, under the order of the District Court of Madura, marked Ex. CC. On November 20th, 1899, by force of orders marked Ex. EE and FF, the first defendants mother who had by Ex. CC been made guardian of the persons of the first defendant and his minor sister jointly with the guardian of their property was appointed guardian of their property also and Krishnasawmi Iyer was discharged from his office. On October 31st, 1900, the first defendant was declared by the court to have attained majority and the guardians powers ceased.

2. Exhibit L was executed by the first defendants mother Rukku Nachiar alone, purporting to act as guardian of the first defendant and his sister. Exhibit A was executed both by the first defendant and his mother, but she does not describe herself therein as his guardian. A comparison of dates easily shows that both documents were executed during the continuance of the guardianship of the guardian of the property appointed by court. The Subordinate Judge has found that the first defendant was below eighteen years when the guardian was appointed. Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar has asked us to come to a different conclusion on the evidence, but on this point we may briefly remark that no evidence, sufficient to rebut the legal presumption that the first defendant was a minor when guardians of his person-and property were appointed by the court having jusisdiction under Act VIII of 1890, has been laid before us.

3. As regards Exhibit L, it has been contended that it is valid on the ground that it was executed by the first defendants mother who was guardian of his person and de facto guardian of his property, if the debt was incurred for necessary purposes. But in the first place there is no proof that she was de facto guardian beyond the vague statement of the plaintiffs 8th and 9th witnesses that her men managed the first defendants villages and there was no suggestion of the kind in Exhibit DD when a motion was made to the court to remove Krishnasawmi Iyer and appoint Rukku Nachiar. In the second place the authorities cited on the appellants behalf fall far short of establishing the proposition that, when a guardian of a minors property is appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act, persons other than such guardians can legally bind the minors estate. It would be exceedingly inconvenient for the minors interests if there was such conflict of authority between guardians. The legislature has in fact provided for such an eventuality so far as guardians appointed by court are concerned. Section 7(2) of the Guardians and Wards Act takes away the power of any guardian net so appointed, by declaring that the courts order appointing a guardian under the Act will have the effect of removing any other guardian. Sections 29 and 30 provide against the lawfully appointed guardian encumbrancing or alienating portions of the minors estate without the courts permission. In Nathu v. Balwant Row I.L.R. (1903) Bom. 90 it was held that an adverse act of a mother, while acting de facto guardian of her son, in disposing of the minors property as if it was her own and purporting to pay her own debts, although the purchase money was in fact applied in payment of debts for which the minor was liable, would not bind the minor for whom a guardian had been appointed by court. The effect of appointments under the Act of extinguishing the powers of a natural guardian is discussed in Ramchander v. Chanda Lal I.L.R. (1904) A.L.J. 460. No doubt these cases are not on all fours with the present, but they show how other courts have treated the powers of certificated guardia