1913 Supreme(Mad) 18
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Krishnamachariar And Ors.
Versus
Chinnammal And Ors.
Decided On : 15 January, 1913
Representatives in a suit under Section 30 of the Old Civil Procedure Code have the authority to enter into a reasonable and honest compromise, which can be avoided only if it is unreasonable, fraudulent, or dishonest.
Headnote:
compromise - authority of representatives - Old Civil Procedure Code - Section 30
Fact of the Case:
The suit was filed to challenge a compromise and decree passed in a previous suit, seeking a declaration that they were not binding, an injunction against executing the decrees, and recovery of possession of properties. The compromise was alleged to be brought about by fraud.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the compromise was binding on the plaintiffs and their representatives, and that the representatives had the authority to enter into a compromise on behalf of the class represented.
Issues: The main issue was whether representatives in a suit under Section 30 of the Old Civil Procedure Code have the authority to enter into a compromise binding on those they represent.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that representatives in a suit have the authority to enter into a reasonable and honest compromise, whether in the original litigation or in appeal, and that such compromise can be avoided only if it is unreasonable, fraudulent, or dishonest.
Final Decision: The court affirmed the decision of the Lower Appellate Court, dismissing the second appeal.
1. The suit which led to this second appeal was instituted for a declaration that the compromise and the decree passed in pursuance of it in A.S. Nos. 31 and 36 of 1908 in the District Court of Trichinopoly were not binding on the plaintiffs and the other Brahmin residents of the two villages, for an injunction restraining defendants 1 to 3 from executing the decrees in those appeals, and for recovering possession of 4 items of properties which the defendants had taken possession of in execution. The decrees which the plaintiffs wanted to avoid were passed on appeals from the decree of the District Munsifs Court of Srirangam in O.S. No. 167 of 1906. That suit was instituted by plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 5 in the present suit for recovery of possession of certain items of property including items Nos. 1 to 4 in the plaint schedule which were claimed to belong to a certain charity. Plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 5 obtained a decree in O.S. No. 167. Some of the defendants in that suit preferred the appeals Nos. 31 and 36 of 1908. While the appeals were pending the parties entered into a compromise by which the appellants there were to be allowed to remain in possession and enjoyment of the lands from which they had been directed to be ejected by the District Munsif on condition of performing certain services but they were not to be entitled to alienate the properties. The suit No. 167 was instituted by the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 5 on behalf of themselves and other Brahmin residents of two villages with leave obtained under Section 30 of the Old Civil Procedure Code, all the Brahmin residents being according to the allegations in the plaint equally entitled to the properties on behalf of the charity. Item No. 4 in the plaint was delivered to the 2nd defendant in pursuance of the decree which was passed in pursuance of the compromise. The present suit was at first instituted by the same persons who had launched the previous suit as the representatives of the Brahmins, but subsequently plaintiffs Nos. 6 to 11 were also made plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged in the present suit that the compromise in the previous suit was brought about by the fraud of the 5th Defendant, who caused the plaintiffs Vakil to sign the compromise by misrepresentation. The District Munsif found that the Vakalat, Exhibit D, executed by the plaintiffs to their Vakil for the conduct of the appeals, itself authorised the Vakil to enter into a compromise and that the Vakils act was therefore binding on the plaintiffs in the previous suit and those represented by them. The Subordinate Judge took the same view with respect to the Vakils authority under Exhibit D to compromise the appeals. He also found that the conduct of the plaintiffs showed that their allegation that the compromise was entered into against their wishes was baseless.
2. We agree with the Subordinate Judge on the construction of the Vakalatnama Exhibit B. It is contended by Mr. Ananthakrishna Aiyar, the learned pleader for the appellant, that, as a decree had been passed in favor of the Brahmins in the Munsifs Court, their representatives had no right to give up the advantage obtained under it by a compromise and that the authority given to the Vakil by the representatives was invalid in law and not binding on the Brahmins. The appeal to the District Court and the second appeal to this Court were preferred only by the representatives of the Brahmins who were actually parties to the appeals that were compromised. In consequence of a question put from the Bench to the appellants Vakil, whether in any event there would not be a bar by personal estoppel to the maintainability of this second appeal by those who were actually parties to the previous appeals, 31 and 36 and who had executed a Vakalatnama authorising their pleader to enter into a compromise, he asked for permission to allow plaintiffs Nos. 6 to 11 to come in as parties to the second appeal and to conduct it on behalf of the Brahmin residents of the