Miller, J.

1. This appeal arises from a suit in which the Raja of Ramnad (the present sole plaintiff) prays the Court to hold that two leases executed by his father, one on the 5th of November 1889 and the other on the 2nd of June 1893, are not binding upon him and to direct the defendant to deliver to him possession of the property affected by them.

2. The principal ground on which the suit is based is that the lessee obtained the leases by the exercise of undue influence. That is denied by the defendants, who also raise many other pleas and among them, a plea that the suit is barred by Article 91 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act.

3. The original lessee died in 1899, and the plaintiffs father was then alive. The suit was instituted in 1904, and it is not contended before us, though it was contended in the Court below, that the undue influence continued after the death of the lessee to be exercised by his sons.

4. For the appellant it is argued that Article 91 is inapplicable to the case, first, because it cannot, in any case, be applied to a suit founded on an allegation of undue influence, and secondly, because the suit is not a suit to cancel or set aside an instrument. As to the first contention, the first column of Article 91 does in terms apply to the suit, because in no other article is provision made for setting aside a deed executed under undue influence, but it is argued that the language of the third column, the column in which the starting point of limitation is set out, is inapplicable to a case of undue influence and consequently the article must be held inapplicable. It is doubtless true that cases can be imagined in which the undue influence may continue for three years after the victim has become fully aware of all the facts entitling him to avoid the consequences of its exercise and may so prevent his taking action, but that possibility does not seem to me to indicate that the starting point is wholly inapplicable; it shows only that there may be cases in which, its application would be a hardship. In very many, if not in most, cases of undue influence, the influence is utilised to distort or misrepresent material facts, and, though it must be confessed that there may be cases in which it will be difficult satisfactorily to apply Article 91, it cannot be said that on its language it is altogether inapplicable, and there is authority for its application which I am unable to disregard. In Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh (1988 I.L.R., 15 Calc., 58 (P.C.), the Privy Council applied it to what, on their Lordships statement of facts, was, it seems to me, clearly a case of undue influence; it was applied also by Subrahmanya Ayyar, J., in Roop Laul v. Lakshmi Doss (1906) I.L.R., 29 Mad., 1, to a case of undue influence, and though his view on the question of limitation was not accepted by the Full Bench, the applicability of Article 91 to the case as a case of undue influence was not questioned. It was held that it did not operate to prevent a defendant in possession from pleading the undue influence to protect his possession. Hasan Ali v. Nazo (1889) I.L.R., 11 All., 456, to which the article was applied, seems also to have been a case of undue influence.

5. An observation of Subrahmanya Ayyar, J., in Roop Laul v. Lakshmi Doss (1906) I.L.R., 29 Mad., 1, suggests that the starting point might be held to be postponed till cessation of the undue influence; that is a question which he had not to decide, and which it is unnecessary for us to decide, for, even if that be so, this suit of 1904 was instituted more than three years after the cessation of the undue influence, which we may assume for the present purpose to have continued down to the death of Ramaswami Chettiar in 1899.

6. I think Article 91 must, on its language and on authority, be held to be applicable to a suit to set aside an instrument on grounds of undue influence.

7. The second contention on behalf of the appellant is that the plaintiff, having