The central legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the Madras Estates Land Act, specifically the definition of 'estate' and the rights of agraharamdars.

1. These second appeals were presented against decrees of the District Court of Kistna reversing the decrees of the District Munsif of Gudivada and dismissing the suits which were instituted by the plaintiffs, some of the Agraharamdars of Paidi Mukkala in the Nuzvid Zamindary, for the ejectment of the defendants, some of the ryots in occupation of lands in the Agraharam. The plaintiffs case is that the defendants are mere temporary tenants having no permanent occupancy rights in the land and that they refused to quit their holdings on notice given to them terminating their tenancy. The defendants contention is that they are entitled to permanent occupancy rights and that the plaintiffs have no power to eject. They also allege that the Agraharam is an estate as defined in Section 3 of the Madras Estates Land Act and that a suit to eject them would not therefore lie in the Civil Court but was cognizable solely by a Revenue Court according to the provisions of the Act.

2. The District Munsif held that the Agraharam was not an estate as defined in the Act and that the ryots had no occupancy right in their holdings, and passed decrees in ejectment.

3. On appeal the District Judge, while agreeing in the Munsifis finding that the defendants had no occupancy right apart from the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act, held that the agraharam in question fell within Clause (e), sub. Section 2 of Section 3 and was, therefore, an estate and that the ryots, therefore, acquired occupancy rights by virtue of the provisions of Section 6(1) as amended by Section 3 of the Amending Act IV of 1909.

4. The first question for decision by this Court is whether the Judges view that the agraharam is an estate within Clause (e) of the definition is correct.

5. The Respondents also contend that, even if it is not included within clause (e), it would fall within clause (d). We are clearly of opinion that clause (e) does not take in this agraharam. That clause refers to " any portion of one or more Villages of any of the estates specified in clause (a), (b) and (c) which is held on a permanent under tenure." Clauses (a), (b) and (c) refer to (a) any permanently settled estate or temporarily settled Zamindary, (6) any portion of such permanently settled estate or temporarily settled Zamindari which is separately registered in the office of the Collector and (c) any unsettled palayam or jaghir. The respondents argument is that the agraharam is a village in a portion of the Nuzvid Zamindary separately registered in the office of the Collector and that it is held on a permanent under tenure. The agraharam was originally granted as Surva Agraharam, that is one free from the payment of any quit-rent by a Nuzvid Zamindar so long ago as 1692. Later on, a Kattubadi of 25 pagodas a year was imposed on it which was subsequently raised to 50 and finally to 100 pagodas a year. All this took place before the permanent settlement of the Nuzvid Zamindary. At the settlement the village was treated as Lakhiraj and excluded from the assets of the Zamindary for the purpose of fixing the assessment payable by the Zamindar, the Kattubadi of 100 pagodas being alone included in those assets. The Judge is wrong in supposing that after its exclusion from the Zamindary at the settlement the agraharam remained a part of the Zamindary, as one of the Villages comprised in it. Any ownership on the part of the Nuzvid Zamindar over the Village ceased at the settlement. His interest in it was confined to the right to receive 100 pagodas a year. This right is not one of ownership but merely a benefit to arise out of the land, the ownership itself being vested in the agraharamdars subject to the right to resumption vested in the Government. The Government enfranchised the agraharam afterwards at the Inam settlement. The agraharamdars do not now hold the Village on an under-tenure under the Zamindar. This Court held in Section A. 1166 of 1911 that an inam excluded at the permanent s