1913 Supreme(Mad) 112
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Imandi Appalaswami And Anr.
Versus
The Rajah Of Vizianagaram
Decided On : 12 March, 1913
The definition of rent in Section 3 Clause 11 of the Estates Land Act does not require the actual use of the land for agricultural purposes by the occupier, as long as the right to use it for agricultural purposes subsists.
Headnote:
Rent - Agricultural Land - Interpretation of Section 3 Clause 11 of the Estates Land Act
Fact of the Case:
The defendant argued that the suit cannot be regarded as one for rent as defined in Section 3 Clause 11 of the Estates Land Act, as the land in question was not being used for agricultural purposes and buildings had been constructed on it long ago.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the definition of rent in Section 3 Clause 11 does not require the actual use of the land for agricultural purposes by the ryot in possession. As long as the right to use the land for agricultural purposes subsists, the occupier is liable to pay rent, even if the land is not used for any purpose or is used for some other purpose.
Issues: Interpretation of Section 3 Clause 11 of the Estates Land Act in relation to the requirement of actual agricultural use for the payment of rent.
Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted that the definition of rent does not necessitate the actual use of the land for agricultural purposes by the occupier, as long as the right to use it for agricultural purposes subsists.
Final Decision: The second appeal was dismissed with costs.
1. The argument urged in second appeal is that as the defendant has not been using the land in question for a long time for agricultural purposes and as he constructed buildings on it long ago, the suit cannot be regarded as one for rent as defined in Section 3 Clause 11 of the Estates Land Act. The definition given in that clause is " whatever is lawfully payable in money or in kind to a landholder for the use or occupation of land in his estate for the purpose of agriculture." In our opinion the definition does not require that the ryot in possession should actually use the land for the purpose of agriculture supposing he does not use the land at all for any purpose or uses it for some other purpose, he is still liable to pay so long as his right to use it for agricultural purposes subsists and that what he is bound to pay is rent. We may add that this point does not seem to have been really raised in the Lower Courts. We dismiss the second appeal with costs.