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1914 Supreme(Mad) 13
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
A White
P.C. Manavikrama Zamorin Raja
Versus
R.P. Achutha Menon
Decided On : 15 January, 1914
The period of limitation for suits related to periodically recurring rights and recovery of moneys due by reason of the alleged right should be the same, as indicated by the legislative intent and the use of the word 'establish' in Article 131.
Headnote:
Article 131 - Periodically Recurring Right - The court construed Article 131 as applying to a suit brought for the purpose of obtaining an adjudication as to the existence of an alleged periodically recurring right, and not to a suit seeking to recover moneys alleged to be due by reason of the alleged right. The period of limitation for both cases should be the same, as it is in the case of a suit for a declaration of a right to maintenance and in a suit for arrears of maintenance. The use of the word 'establish' and the fact that there is only one article in the case of a suit with reference to a periodically recurring right indicate that the legislature intended to deal with both classes of suits in Article 131.
Fact of the Case:
The court considered the interpretation of Article 131 in relation to a suit brought for the purpose of obtaining an adjudication as to the existence of an alleged periodically recurring right, and not to a suit seeking to recover moneys alleged to be due by reason of the alleged right.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the period of limitation for both cases should be the same, as it is in the case of a suit for a declaration of a right to maintenance and in a suit for arrears of maintenance. The court also noted that the use of the word 'establish' and the fact that there is only one article in the case of a suit with reference to a periodically recurring right indicate that the legislature intended to deal with both classes of suits in Article 131.
Issues: Interpretation of Article 131 in relation to suits for periodically recurring rights and recovery of moneys due by reason of the alleged right.
Ratio Decidendi: The period of limitation for suits brought for the purpose of obtaining an adjudication as to the existence of an alleged periodically recurring right should be the same as suits seeking to recover moneys alleged to be due by reason of the alleged right, as indicated by the use of the word 'establish' and the legislative intent.
Final Decision: The court answered the question in the affirmative, indicating that Article 131 applies to both classes of suits.
Arnold White, C.J.
1. If this matter had been res integra I should have been disposed to hold that Article 131 should be construed as applying to a suit brought for the purpose of obtaining an adjudication as to the existence of an alleged periodically recurring right, and not to a suit in which it was sought to recover moneys alleged to be due by reason of the alleged right. The question of the existence of the right is no doubt distinct from the question of the right to recover moneys if it is established that the right exists. It is however, difficult to see why the period of limitation should not in both cases be the same, as it is in the case of a suit for a declaration of a right to maintenance and in a suit for arrears of maintenance. If the contention of the appellant is well founded there is no article which deals specifically with the period of limitation in the case of a suit to recover moneys due under an alleged periodically recurring right. There is force in the contention that the use of the word "establish" and the fact that there is only one article in the case of a suit with reference to a periodically recurring right, and not two as in the case, of suits based on an alleged right to maintenance (see Articles 128 and 129) indicate that the legislature intended to deal with both classes of suits in Article 131. I am not prepared to dissent from the view indicated in the Madras cases referred to in the order of reference, a view which has also been adopted by the Bombay High Court. See Sakharam Hari v. Laxmipriya Tirtha Swami (1910) I.L.L. 34 B. 349. I would answer the question, which has been referred to us in the affirmative,
Sankaran Nair, J.
2. The question is not free from doubt. But, I am not prepared to differ from the decisions of this Court and I would therefore answer the question in the affirmative.
Oldfiled, J.
3. I agree with the learned Chief Justice for the reasons stated by him.
