1. The contention of the appellant (see the 3rd ground in the appeal memorandum) is that because on the 20th November 1912 an order had been passed by a 2nd class Magistrate under Section 144 of the Cr.P.C. prohibiting the other party going through the old pathway in the appellants land there was no likelihood of a breach of the peace on 25th November 1912 and hence the proceedings of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate taken under Section 147 (the proceedings having been begun on 25th November 1912) were without jurisdiction.

2. But if the Sub-Divisional Magistrate really thought that notwithstanding the order under Section 144 of the Crl.P.C. (passed within a week before his taking steps under Section 147 of the Crl.P.C.) the likelihood of a breach of the peace still existed, we do not think that it could be argued that the Magistrate was legally incompetent to entertain such, a thought and hence was legally incompetent to take action under Section 147. No doubt, we, as a court of revision, might interfere if we consider that his apprehension was quite unreasonable but we are not satisfied that it was so unreasonable.

3. The next contention is that as the appellant had obstructed th