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1914 Supreme(Mad) 281
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Oldfield
In Re: Thayyanayaki Achi
Versus
Unknown
Decided On : 30 July, 1914
Special circumstances may justify the departure from the general rule of appointing a Receiver, and the Court's discretion in such appointments should be respected.
Headnote:
Receiver - Appointment of Receiver - Special Circumstances Justifying Departure from General Rule
Fact of the Case:
The lower Court justified the appointment of a Receiver due to special circumstances, including the small estate and inability to afford a paid Receiver. The appellant's nominee for an honorary Receiver was refused, and the lower Court's discretion in this matter was upheld.
Finding of the Court:
The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower Court's decision to appoint a Receiver and rejecting the appellant's contentions regarding the necessity of the appointment and the appointment of an honorary Receiver.
Issues: Appointment of Receiver, Necessity of Appointment, Appointment of Honorary Receiver
Ratio Decidendi: The special circumstances of the case justified the departure from the general rule that one party should not be appointed a Receiver without the others consent. The lower Court's discretion in appointing a Receiver and refusing the services of an honorary Receiver was upheld.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower Court's decision to appoint a Receiver to protect the estate.
Oldfield, J.
1. It is, no doubt, a general rule that one party should not be appointed a Receiver without the others consent. But departure from that rule may be justified by the special circumstances of the case. Such special circumstances have, in my opinion, been shown by the lower Court to exist; and I may also refer to the fact that the estate is comparatively small and can ill-afford the, cost of a paid Receiver. Appellant contends that the respectable person nominated by her should be appointed without payment. I am not, however, prepared to hold that the lower Court used its discretion wrongly in refusing his services, since the Courts control over an honorary Receiver must always be small.
2. It is further contended that no appointment is necessary because it will not be advantageous to call in some of the debts in question, which represent profitable investments and should not be terminated. It will be open to appellant to move the lower Court with reference to these items to direct the Receiver not to sue for them at once, if postponement is advantageous to the estate. The fact, if it be one, that there are such items, is not material with reference to the general question whether a Receiver to protect the estate should be appointed.
3. This appeal is dismissed.
