The judgment establishes the principle that the starting point of limitation for the recovery of property under Article 144 of the Limitation Act is the date of the adopted son's adoption, and that the defendants cannot acquire any right by prescription against the plaintiff.

John Edward Power Wallis, Kt. Officiating C.J.

1. We see no reason to differ from the clear and well reasoned judgment of the Subordinate Judge. The question is whether the suit properties belonged to Bapayya who died about 1859, or to his wife Kannamma who died in 1875. From at least 1827 to 1875 when Rama-chandrudu Bapayyas son died, the suit lands are shown to have been cultivated by them. After Bapayyas death part of the land was alienated by Ramachandrudus guardian. After Ramachandrudus death there were disputes between his young widow who many years later adopted the plaintiff and his mother Kannamma, and eventually it was agreed to divide the properties between them. The lands which fell to Kannamma are now in possession of the descendants of heir daughters. The plaintiff suggests that the grant to Kannamma was for her maintenance and that after her death Kotamma failed to recover the properties and that on his adoption in 1904 he acquired a good cause of action.

2. We think the long possession of Bapayya and his son raises the presumption that the lands were their property. On the other hand, the defendants have altogether failed to prove that the properties ever belonged to Kannammas father who is said to have borne the name of Akkayya. The emindari accounts show that one Akkayya owned some of the suit lands in 1802 but there is no reliable evidence, he was Kannammas father, and as Bapayya and Ramachandrudu acquired lands, it may well be as observed by the Subordinate Judge that these particular lands were acquired from strangers.

3. The probability is that on the death of Ramachandrudu leaving a childless widow his mother Kannamma who had her daughters children living with her ordered Kotamma to allow her to have half of the properties. Such an arrangement would not be unnatural and is, we think, borne out by the evidence. Subsequently the grant to Kannamma was referred to by Kotamma as made for her maintenance. It is of course clear that such an arrangement could not bind the reversioners or a subsequently adopted son. The Subordinate Judge has held that the suit was not barred, following the judgment of Bhashyam Iyengar J. in Sreeramulu v. Kistnamma (1902) I.L.R. 26 M. 148. Though the observations of that learned Judge were obiter they were in accordance with the decision of Farran C.J. and Candy J. in Moro Narayana Joshi v. Balaji Raghunath (1892) I.L.R. 19 B. 809 which was followed by Jenkins C.J. and Candy. J. in Hart v. Woman (1901) 2 Bom. L.R. 411 and by Harrington and Mookerjee JJ. in Harrack Chand Babu v. Bejoy Chand Mohatab (1905) 9. C.W.N. 795. In these decisions it has been held that an adopted son is entitled under Article 144 to sue for immoveable property within 12 years from the date of adoption. We have also been referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Runcho Das v. Parvati Bai (1899) I.L.R. 28 B. 725 that a reversioners right to sue for moveable property accrues on the death of the widow and that consequently he has six years under Article 120 which supports the same view.

4. For these reasons I am of opinion that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. The memorandum of objections is dismissed with costs.

Seshagiri lyer, J.

5. The learned Chief Justice has found on the facts. I entirely agree. The point which arises for decision is whether the adopted sons right is lost by the defendants having acquired title to the property by adverse possession against his mother : Under the Limitation Act XIV of 1859, it was settled law that adverse possession against a widow in possession as limited owner bound the reversioners as well as the adopted sons. See Amritlal Bose v. Rajonikant Mitter (1874) 15. B.L.R.

10. P.C; Krishnaji janardhan v. Morbhat (1888) I.L.R. 13 B. 276 and Atchamma v. Subbarayudu (1870) 5 M.H.C.R. 428. The principle of these decisions seems to be that, as a widow in possession represented the estate for the time being, prescription against her affected the estate and