The main legal point established in the judgment is that for a payment to save the statute of limitations, it must be made as an admission of a right in the recipient to the balance of the debt, and a proper acknowledgment of subsisting liability is required.

Venkatasubba Rao, J.

1. The questions that arise are, first, whether the payment relied upon by the plaintiff has the effect of preventing the bar of limitation; secondly, in the alternative, whether there is such an acknowledgment of liability as is sufficient for that purpose.

2. The plaintiff, alleging that a certain sum was due to him, has filed the suit. The defendant pleads that there was a mediation at which an amount smaller than the sum claimed, was fixed as due by him and that he paid the sum so fixed in full discharge of the plaintiffs claim. The plaintiff contends that his suit is not barred as it has been brought within 3 years from the date of the payment. The defendant wrote a letter mentioning the fact of the payment and the plaintiffs further contention is, that it contains a sufficient acknowledgment. The lower Court has found on the issues of fact, that the defendant has failed to prove that there was a mediation and that on the date of the payment there was still a balance due.

3. In the letter in question, the defendant, alleging the mediation, states expressly that beyond the amount he is remitting, no further sum is due; in other words, that the payment is in full discharge of the debt. Does such a payment have the effect under Section 20 of the Limitation Act of removing the statutory bar? This turns upon the view to be taken of the nature of the part-payment referred to in that Section. It is enacted that a part-payment saves the Statute, upon the principle that it implies an admission of right and an acknowledgment of liability? The plaintiff contends that the section does not require that the payment should be one from which an acknowledgment could be inferred, and for that contention he finds support in the fact that in the case of part-payment of the principal, the section does not say that it should be made as such, the omission being significant as those words occur in connection with the payment of interest. But I think it must be regarded as a fundamental principle that the Statute is not checked, unless the part-payment is made as an admission of a right in the recipient to the balance of the debt; in other words, the payment must be such as to amount to an acknowledgment of liability. In English law a part-payment accompanied by a denial of the debt is not sufficient; it is said that the principle on which a part-payment saves the statute is, that it admits a larger debt to be due at the time of the part-payment, in other words, that it recognises or affirms the indebtedness. It would no doubt be unsafe to construe or give effect to the provisions of an Indian Statute in the light of the English principles; but the English Judges have pointed out that it is a principle applicable to part-payment under all statutes of limitations, that it must be made as an admission; of right: this is thus a principle of universal application and does not depend for its validity upon the wording of a particular enactment. If a debtor makes a payment which the evidence discloses is only in part, there being nothing in the circumstances to show that he was unwilling to treat it as part-payment, the Court may, and does very properly infer that the payment implies an admission of a right in the payee to the balance of the debt. Thus from a part-payment unaccompanied by an express denial or repudiation, an admission of right may be inferred. But where, without there being a bare naked payment, the debtor expressly states that the payment is in full discharge, in such a case, far from its amounting to an admission of right, there is an unequivocal denial of it.

4. In Harlock v. Ashberry (1882) 19 Ch. D. 539 it was held that a payment to come within Sections 2 and 24 of 3 and 4 Will. 4 c. 27 and consequently within the supplementary enactment of 1 Viet. c. 28, must be one made by the mortgagor or some person bound to pay on his behalf. Holker, L.J. refers to the payment in question as one enforced against a tena