The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the words 'subject-matter' and 'proceeding' within Section 17(2)(vi) of the Indian Registration Act and their applicability to consent decrees and orders.

Venkatasubba Rao, J.

1. The question raised in this case relates to the construction of Section 17(2)(vi) of the Indian Registration 4ct. Under the clause as it originally stood, "decrees and orders of Courts and awards" were excepted from registration; but by an amendment made by Section 10 of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929, the following clause was substituted:

any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising Immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding.

2. In Hementa Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zemindari & Co. (1919) L.R. 46 IndAp 240 (246) : I.L.R. Cal. 485 : 37 M.L.J. 525 the Judicial Committee held, having regard to the wording of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that where a suit is adjusted by a lawful agreement between the parties, the proper course is to recite the agreement in the decree or annex it as a schedule to the decree, but in either case the operative part of the decree should be confined to the actual subject-matter of the suit; then turning to the Indian Registration Act of 1908 and considering the meaning of the word decree in Section 17(2)(vi), they further held that there was no reason why a limit should be imposed upon the meaning of the word so as to confine it to the operative portion only of the decree, adding:

It may be that as a decree it was incapable of being executed outside the lands of the suit, but that does not prevent it being received in evidence of its contents.

3. The result of this decision is, that the entire decree was excepted from registration, that is to say, that part of it which related to the suit as well as that which was extraneous to it; in other words, for the purpose of the Registration Act, in the case of a consent decree, the expression decree meant the whole of it - both the operative part and the part relating to matters outside the suit. It was while the law was in this state, that the amendment was made.

4. The first question that arises is, Does the consent decree in question comprise Immovable property which is the "subject-matter of the suit"? To answer this question, I must first briefly state the facts. Rasu Mudaliar (the respondent) filed O.S. No. 6 of 1931 for the recovery of a sum of money from the defendants in that suit. On his application certain properties were attached before judgment and notice was directed to the defendants. Both the application and the suit came on for hearing on the 30th January, 1931. On that day the parties entered into a compromise and a decree was made embodying its terms. The compromise decree provided for the payment of the amount claimed in three months and created a charge for the sum decreed over the properties that had already been attached. As regards the application, an order was simultaneously made, - which ran thus:

Petition is dismissed.

5. About two years later, Govindaswami Mudaliar (the petitioner) obtained a money-decree against the same defendants in S.C. No. 18 of 1933 and attached the properties already mentioned. Rasu Mudaliar (the respondent) preferred a claim under Order 21, Rule 58 of the Civil Procedure Code, asserting that by virtue of his compromise decree, he obtained a valid charge over the properties and that his opponent could bring them to sale, only subject to his own charge. This contention was upheld by the lower Court.

6. The first question that arises on these facts, as I have said, is, can it be held that the properties in question are the "subject-matter" of the suit O.S. No. 6 of 1931? The respondents Counsel in support of his contention that they are, relies upon the decisions that have construed the words "relates to the suit" occurring in Order 23, Rule 3, of the Civil Procedure Code. In Joti Kruvetappa v. Izari Sirusappa I.L.R.(1907) 30 Mad. 478 ; 16 M.L.J. 354 where the relief claimed was for a money decree only but the compromise decree made th