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1950 Supreme(Mad) 124

MADRAS HIGH COURT
SATYANARAYANA RAO
Rajammal
Versus
R. Gopalaswami Naidu
Second Appeal No. 634 of 1947 and C. r. p. No. 1338 of 1948
Decided On : 20 March, 1950

Advocates Appeared:
C.R. Krishnarao for K. Narasimha Iyer - for Applt.; K. Krishnasami Iyengar and N.C. Raghavachari -- for Resp.

A contract to sell or resell does not create any interest in immovable property under the Transfer of Property Act, and therefore the rule against perpetuities does not apply to such contracts.

Headnote:

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - AGREEMENT TO RECONVEY - UNCERTAINTY - TIME AND CONSIDERATION - RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES - DISCRETION OF COURT - GROUNDS FOR REFUSAL.

Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff (appellant) filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to reconvey executed by the defendant (respondent) in her favor. The defendant resisted the suit on various grounds, including uncertainty of the agreement, violation of the rule against perpetuities, and the court's discretion to grant specific performance.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the agreement was not uncertain or vague regarding the consideration and time of performance. It also held that the agreement did not offend the rule against perpetuities, as a contract to sell or resell does not create any interest in immovable property under the Transfer of Property Act.

Issues: 1. Whether the agreement to reconvey was uncertain or vague regarding the consideration and time of performance. 2. Whether the agreement offended the rule against perpetuities. 3. Whether the court was justified in refusing specific performance.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court found that the agreement clearly stated the consideration of Rs. 1800 for the retransfer of the property and that the parties contemplated performance within a reasonable time. 2. The court held that the rule against perpetuities does not apply to contracts to sell or resell under the Transfer of Property Act, as such contracts do not create any interest in immovable property. 3. The court found that the grounds relied upon by the lower court to refuse specific performance, such as the existence of a clause providing for payment of profit in case of resale and the plaintiff's alleged false case regarding the dates of the documents, were not valid reasons to deny specific performance.

Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, and restored the decree of the trial court granting specific performance. The court also rectified the decree of the trial court by adding a direction that the plaintiff should deposit the consideration amount within three months from the date of the judgment.

Judgement

Judgment :- The pltf. is the applt. in the second appeal. She instituted the suit out of which this second appeal arises for specific performance of an agreement to reconvey executed by the deft, in favour of the pltf. on 27-9-1943, Ex. P. 1. The deft, obtained conveyance of property under Ex. d. 1 dated 24-9-1943 for a stated consideration of Rs. 1500. The suit was resisted by the deft, on various grounds the chief of which and which survive in this second appeal are, that the contract is vague as regards the amount of consideration and also the time of performance and that it is unenforceable as it offends the rule against perpetuity. It was also contended that, in any event, the pltf. should not have been granted a decree for specific performance in the exercise of the discretionary power vested in the Ct. to decree specific performance of contracts, recognised under S. 22, Specific Relief Act. The trial Ct. negatived all the contentions urged by the deft. and decreed the suit for specific performance. The deft, appealed against the decree to the Dist. J. The Dist. J. agreed with the Dist. Munsif in holding that the agreement to reconvey was not uncertain and vague and that it was capable of specific performance, but in view of certain circumstances which the learned Judge had adverted in para. 11 of his judgment he was of opinion that it was a fit case in which the discretion of the Ct. should not be exercised in favour of the pltf. by granting a decree for specific performance. He, however, opined that it was a fit case in which compensation should be awarded under S. 19, Specific Relief Act, granted leave to amend the plaint and remitted the case to the trial Ct. for disposal on the amended plaint after framing the necessary issues.

2. This second appeal is by the pltf. against the decree of the learned Dist. J, To complete the narrative regarding the course of this litigation it may be mentioned that after remand the suit seems to have been dismissed for default of the pltf. and an appln. for restoration of the suit made by the pltf. was also dismissed, by the Dist Munsif, and the order of the Dist. Munsif was confirmed on appeal by the Dist. J. The pltf. preferred civil revn. petn. No. 1338 of 1948 against the order of the Dist. J. confirming the order of dismissal for default. That civil revn. petn. also is posted for disposal along with this second appeal.

3. For the applt. the argument was confined to the question whether the learned Dist. J. was right in interfering with the discretion of the Dist. Munsif in granting a decree for specific performance and whether there were really any grounds for holding that that discretion was not judicially exercised by the Dist. Munsif. The resp., however, attacked the finding of the Dist. J. that the contract was not vague and uncertain and argued also that in any event, the contract was bad as it offends the rule against the perpetuities. At the close of the arguments on behalf of the resp. a further point was also sought to be raised, namely, that the pltf. did not aver her readiness and willingness to perform the contract and that, in any event, there was considerable lapse of time between the date of the agreement to reconvey and the institution of the suit and, by reason of the long lapse of time, a decree for specific performance should not have been granted in favour of the pltf. This last contention, however, need not take any time for disposal as the pltf. did aver in the plaint of her readiness and willingness to perform her part of the contract and the suit itself was instituted by her expeditiously within six months after the date of the execution of the agreement. The learned advocate for the resp. frankly conceded that the point was not taken by his client in the Cts. below. However, it is unnecessary to consider that question as there is a clear allegation in the plaint of the pltf.s preparedness and her willingness to carry out the terms of the contract.

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