The Court held that the charges framed against the petitioner were vague and indefinite, and that they did not provide sufficient information to enable him to respond effectively. The Court also held that the procedure adopted by the railway administration was unfair and mala fide, as it appeared that the administration had decided to terminate the petitioner's services even before receiving his explanation.

ORDER :- In January 1954, the petitioner was an Assistant Bridge Inspector in the employ of the Southern Railway. Under the rules then in force disciplinary action against such an employee could be taken in one of the following ways :

1. Under R. 148 of the Railway Establishment Code his services could be terminated by notice (or salary in lieu of notice) of a specified duration;

2. One or more of the punishments enumerated in Chap. 17 of the Railway Establishment Code could be imposed on him for misconduct proved in the manner provided in the chapter;

3. Under the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1949, his services could be terminated for what has been described as subversive activities.

2. On 25-1-1954 the General Manager of the Southern Railway wrote to the petitioner intimating him that it was proposed to take action against him under the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, and requiring him to say whether he wished to proceed on such leave as was due to him. On 18-2-1954 the petitioner replied that he was surprised at the communication that had been sent to him, that he was ignorant of the grounds on which it was proposed to take action and that there was no provision in the rules whereby he could be compelled to go on leave. However, without, prejudice he asked for 15 days leave to be granted to him. No order granting leave appears to have been issued.

On 15-3-1954 the General Manager of the Southern Railway issued a notice to the petitioner telling him that in the opinion of the "competent authority" there were reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner was engaged in subversive activities and that consequently his services were liable to be terminated. Six grounds were then set out as the basis of the proposed action.

He was required to state within 14 days of the receipt of the notice "whether he accepted or denied the accuracy of the above allegations; and if he did not reply within the above period, it would be assumed that he admitted the allegation. "He was also told that within the period of 14 days he might limit any representations he might desire to make as to why his services should not be terminated. On 21-3-1954 the petitioner was placed under suspension.

While the proceedings issued in pursuance of the notice D/-15-3-1954 were still pending, a new set of rules came into force. These are called the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954. So on 15-7-1954 a fresh notice was issued to the petitioner under the new rules. There is no material difference between the notice issued on 15-3-1954 and the notice issued on 15-7-1954 and the annexure thereto.

On 26th July 1954 the petitioner came to this Court praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings instituted on the basis of the notice dated 15-7-1954 and, in the alternative, for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to forbear from taking any further proceedings against him on the basis of that notice.

3. Learned counsel for the respondent took the preliminary objection that the petition is premature. According to him the petitioner has so far suffered no injury and he is bound to wait till the President has passed orders under R. 3 of the Rules of 1954. According to him, the petitioner cannot seek the protection of this Court when the disciplinary enquiry against him is still pending.

Now, the circumstance that disciplinary proceedings are pending would very frequently be treated by this Court as a good ground for refusing to interfere; but such a circumstance is not an absolute bar and does not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to act in appropriate instances. In the present case the petitioner has been suspended from his duties and therefore he has been actually and substantially hurt. To say that he has not been injured and that, therefore, he has no right to come to this Court is to ignore realities.

4. Reference may be made