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1955 Supreme(Mad) 169

MADRAS HIGH COURT
RAJAMANNAR,RAJAGOPALAN,RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
Palaniswami Gounder
Versus
Devanai Ammal and others
Appeal No. 262 of 1950
Decided On : 5 May, 1955

Advocates Appeared:
T.P. Gopalakrishnan, for Appellant; S. Thyagarajan, for Respondents.

The words "if he marries again" in S. 2(4) of the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946, refer to a future marriage, i.e., marriage after the Act.

Headnote:

HINDU MARRIED WOMEN'S RIGHT TO SEPARATE RESIDENCE AND MAINTENANCE ACT - S. 2(4) - RETROSPECTIVE OR PROSPECTIVE - CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORDS "IF HE MARRIES AGAIN" - WHETHER THE ACT IS DECLARATORY OR REMEDIAL.

Fact of the Case:

A Hindu wife filed a suit for separate maintenance and residence against her husband, for herself and for her minor daughters. The husband resisted the suit on the ground that she was living away from him without sufficient cause and that he was prepared to take her back and allow her to live with him. The defendant married a second wife, as the first plaintiff did not bear him a male child, which marriage was, according to him, with the approval of the first plaintiff.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946, is not retrospective in nature and, therefore, the first plaintiff cannot take advantage of the second marriage of the defendant and claim maintenance. The court also held that the suit for separate maintenance is based on other grounds as cruelty, abandonment etc. and remanded the suit for disposal in the light of these observations and the opinion of the Full Bench on the question as to the retrospective nature of the Act.

Issues: 1. Whether the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946, is retrospective in nature? 2. Whether the first plaintiff is entitled to separate maintenance and residence on the ground of cruelty, abandonment etc.?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the words "if he marries again" in S. 2(4) of the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946, refer to a future marriage, i.e., marriage after the Act. The court reasoned that the language used in the clause is plain and unambiguous and does not admit of any ambiguity. To do otherwise would be to lead to inconvenient and unjust results which should always be avoided in judicial interpretation of the words of a statute. 2. The court held that the Act is not declaratory in nature, at any rate so far as the clause in question is concerned. The court reasoned that the Act in form is not declaratory and does not contain the words "declared" and "enacted".

Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, the decree of the trial Court was set aside and the suit was remanded for disposal in the light of the observations of the court and the opinion of the Full Bench on the question as to the retrospective nature of the Act.

Judgement

ORDER OF REFERENCE KRISHNASWAMI NAYUDU, J. :- This appeal arises out of a suit for separate maintenance and residence by a Hindu wife against her husband, for herself, and fat her minor daughters.

2. The first plaintiff, the wife, was married to the defendant 20 years prior to the suit. The 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs are two of the surviving daughters of the marriage. The plaintiffs case is that on account of cruelty on the part of the husband, the first plaintiff was obliged to leave him. The suit for maintenance was resisted by the husband on the ground that she was living away from him without sufficient cause and that he was prepared to take her back and allow her to live with him. The defendant married a second wife, as the first plaintiff did not bear him a male child, which marriage was, according to him, with the approval of the first plaintiff.

3. The learned Subordinate Judge did not consider it necessary to examine the allegations of cruelty in view of the passing of the Hindu Married Womens Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act 19 of 1946. A contention was raised on behalf of the defendant that the said Act was not retrospective in character and would not afford the first plaintiff, a ground to claim separate maintenance, as admittedly in this case the marriage took place long before the passing of the Act. But the learned Judge following the decision of Viswanatha Sastri, J. in - Lakshmiammal v. Narayanaswami Naicker, 1950 Mad 321 (AIR V 37) (A), who took the view that the Act was retrospective in character, granted maintenance.

4. In the present appeal, the correctness of the view taken by Viswanatha Sastri, J. is canvassed. In so far as our High Court is concerned, Raghava Rao, J. in - S.A. No. 556 of 1947 (Mad) (B), followed Viswanatha Sastri, J. and held that the Act was retrospective. One of us (Krishnaswami Nayudu, J.) had occasion to consider this question in - Sidda Setty v. Muniamma, 1953 Mad 712 (AIR V 40) (C), though, that question did not directly arise for consideration in that case, and a contrary view was taken.

5. The decision of the question turns upon the interpretation of the words "if he marries again" in S. 2(4) of Act 19 of 1946. Viswanatha Sastri, J. took the view that the words "marries again" are merely descriptive of the position of the husband as a twice married man at the date when the wifes claim for separate maintenance is made under the Act and do not exclude a husband who had taken a second wife before the Act from its operation.

In - Lakshmibai v. Wamanrao, 1953 Bom, 342 (AIR V 40) (D), a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Rajadhyaksha and Vyas, JJ. before whom the decision in 1960 Mad 321 (AIR V 37) (A), was cited, did not accept the view that the Act was retrospective and held that the words "if he marries again" must be interpreted as meaning "if he marries again after the Act comes into force", and any earlier marriage, of the husband prior to the coming into force of the Act will not confer upon the wife the right to claim separate residence and maintenance.

The learned Judges agreed with the view of Hidayatullah and R. Kaushalendra Rao, JJ. in - Sukhiribai v. Pokkal Singh, i960 Nag 33 (AIR V 37) (E), that the Act could not be called a "declaratory Act" in the strict sense of the term and therefore could not be given a retrospective operation as a declaratory Act and the Act was a remedial measure and Cl. (4) of S. 2 thereof must be given prospective operation.

6. The matter came up in a first appeal before Subba Rao and Ramaswami, JJ. whose decision is reported in - Nagendramma v. Ramakotayya, 1954 Mad 713 (AIR V 41) (F). Ramaswami, J. delivering the leading judgment, accepted the view of Sastri, J. that the words "marries again" in S. 2(4) of Act 19 of 1946

"are merely descriptive of the position of the husband as a twice married man at the date when the wifes claim for separate maintenance is made under the Act and do not exclude a husband who has taken a


































































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